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Preface
“In my view, economic theory is "just" an arena for the investigation of
concepts we use in thinking about real-life economic situations. [...] Through
the investigation of these concepts, we try to better understand reality, and
the models provide a language that enables us to think about economic
interactions in a systematic way. ”
A. Rubinstein (2012), Introduction
This dissertation is special in the sense that it contains three distinct topics from seemingly
entirely different areas of economics: Decision theory, Agency theory, and Macroeconomics.
Thus, at first glance, it consists of three projects concerning scenarios without any common
features. Especially in times of increased specialization with regard to the own field of exper-
tise, such a mixture of projects containing not only topics from Microeconomics in form of
individual decision making and Game theory but also aggregate behavior of the overall econ-
omy might appear surprising.
From a high-level overview, however, there exist at least two connected unifying elements.
First, all projects represent applications of economic theory to real-life questions and puz-
zles in economics. Using economic theories based on specific assumptions regarding human
and/or other economic entities’ behavior permits economists to explore complex problems
within a simplified representation by focusing on the essentials. It provides an elegant tool
and a commonly comprehensible language to analyze real-life economic issues. In essence,
the use of economic models to study economic interactions presents a mode of thought that
is not restricted to one specific area of economics only but that is broadly applicable. To say it
with the words of John Maynard Keynes (1938): "Economics is a science of thinking in terms of
1
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models joined to the art of choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary world."
Second, strongly related to the first point, there is the author’s general and broad interest in
basically all economic topics. In fact, the first point enabled and fueled the second. Early
on during my Bachelor’s program, I recognized the beauty and elegance of economic models
to express and exemplify real-life phenomena. It was an astonishing experience to discover a
new technique that enabled me to analytically think about individual decision making, strate-
gic interaction among economic agents, as well as the behavior of an economy as a whole. The
fascination of learning a method applicable to setups in Microeconomics as well as Macroe-
conomics has remained to this day. For me, economic models have always been more than
a summary of numbers or variables: they are applied logic and exhibit meaning that can be
expressed in form of mathematical equations and graphs. When applied sophisticatedly, they
represent a valuable analytical tool able to shed light on various puzzling economic phenom-
ena in different areas and to provide answers to problems we face in reality. In this disserta-
tion, I aim to accomplish exactly that.
All chapters included in this work are based on self-contained papers and can be read inde-
pendently of each other. They are complemented by separated appendices and a joint bibli-
ography I present at the end of this dissertation. In what follows, I provide an overview of the
main points developed in each chapter, respectively.
In Chapter 1, I analyze the consequences arising if individuals overstate the representative-
ness of finite random sample data, i.e., the consequences of individuals being ignorant about
the existence of random errors associated with randomly drawn samples. Decades of re-
search in psychology as well as in economics have shown that human beings tend to be "semi-
sophisticated" statisticians at best and tend to be prone to apparently "irrational" behavior.
Figuring out in what way exactly individuals fail to behave as sophisticated statisticians might
thus lead to explanations for observed deviations from the behavior postulated by the theory
of strict rationality. The focus of my approach lies on probabilistic assessments of an uncer-
tain future event, preceding actual decision making. I show how beliefs based on random
error neglect are systematically flawed and stand in contrast to those made by rational agents,
or as I call them in this chapter: sophisticated statisticians.
In contrast to the vast majority of literature, I do not assume perception biases or the simple
2
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use of heuristics as an explanation for rather particular behavioral fallacies. In my approach,
all individuals are fully capable of using the best-possible unbiased estimation strategies in
each context. Further, they do not specify the underlying model incorrectly. For example,
they do not assume a linear regression model while the true connection of two variables is
quadratic. However, they do not behave like fully rational agents because they fail to account
for the existence of random errors when dealing with limited sample data. In other words, they
believe their sample estimates – mean and variance in the context of a static random variable
or intercept and slope parameter in the context of regression analysis – to be constants, not
random variables.
The rather simple assumption of individuals naively extrapolating from sample properties to
distribution properties has great explanatory power concerning statistical fallacies. It can ac-
count for various well-established empirical phenomena, such as framing effects, overpreci-
sion, overinflated skepticism about other people’s opinions, misperception of differences in
groups, and unjustified belief in the persistence of trends.
Further, I show how this theoretical set-up can be incorporated into existing economic mod-
els. One example is the bidding behavior in auctions. This theory can explain why overbid-
ding is a more prominent feature in First-Price Sealed-Bid auctions than underbidding. Addi-
tionally, it illustrates why people who, according to the standard theory, bid too little, deviate
stronger from the rational bidding behavior than those who bid too much.
In addition to its explanatory power and its broad applicability, this theory has the advantage
of specifying the degree by which individuals neglecting random errors deviate from rational
assessments: it lies entirely in the size of the samples these individuals consider. If the indi-
vidual only considers enough realizations, his probabilistic assessment will be approximately
close to the one of a sophisticated statistician. This might offer a way to easily improve peo-
ples’ predictions and the resulting actions: even though the actual neglect may not be cured,
increasing the officially required number of outcomes an individual has to consider before
forming an opinion can significantly improve the resulting behavior.
In Chapter 2, which is joint work with Annemarie Gronau (LMU), we show how a principal
should optimally apply the concept of Autonomy Support as a non-monetary incentive to an
agent in order to increase the likelihood of successful innovative activity. Autonomy Support
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refers to actions and management methods of, for example, a supervisor to encourage inde-
pendent choices and the initiative of employees. Further, it is supposed to provide meaning
and on-the-job training, and, most importantly, renounce to put any form of pressure on the
agent to take certain actions (Stone et al., 2009).
Within firms, workers frequently exhibit hands-on experience with products and production
processes. As a result, they may have implicit and unique knowledge to improve them. For
example, they might be suited best to fully understand customers’ wishes and finding ways to
(creatively) meet them. Hence, encouraging their creativity can lead to meaningful improve-
ments for the production and the design of a new product and consequentially, its ability to
compete with other products. A vast amount of literature has shown, however, that compa-
nies can only make limited use of monetary incentives to encourage these innovations; such
explicit incentives are only valid tools to incentivize target-oriented solutions to specific prob-
lems but not for unconstrained innovations needing proper creativity. Thus, relying solely on
monetary incentives deprives a company of the full innovative potential of its workforce. In
practice, the workers under consideration are not specifically employed for completing cre-
ative tasks. It is the environment at work that influences whether they feel free to think about
new ideas and process improvements, and further, whether they feel safe enough to share
these ideas with their superiors. In other words, their environment influences whether they
dare to challenge the status quo by being creative.
In contrast to the majority of literature in organizational economics, our focus lies not on one
specific management practice, but on the general behavior of a leader that fosters and invites
novel ideas. We argue that leadership behavior that is successful in instilling such innovative
activity is Autonomy Supportive.
To illustrate our point, we develop a theoretical model in which a representative agent enters a
firm with an initial level of Autonomy Support, e.g., from prior education or previous employ-
ment. We assume, however, that the level of Autonomy Support does not remain constant
over time: a single act of encouragement does not plausibly motivate innovation indefinitely.
Thus, we assume that the level of Autonomy Support an agent possesses depreciates over time
at a given rate. As a result, the investments in Autonomy Support must be made repeatedly
to remain effective, capturing the necessity of ongoing leadership behavior in a working rela-
tionship. We account for this repeated setup by modeling the interaction of a principal with
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an agent, not in a static, but a dynamic two-period interaction setup.
Our results generate several different investment patterns: First of all, we find that the princi-
pal invests just enough to achieve a level that provides optimal innovative effort by the agent
after observing his initial endowment of Autonomy Support. This captures the intuition that
while some individuals need extensive investments in the form of encouragement and skill
training, for others, shorter (but nevertheless regular) meetings might suffice. In other words,
leadership behavior must adapt to the specific requirements of an employee. Second, we find
that for extremely low and/or high initial levels of Autonomy Support, the principal does not
provide a positive amount. The reason is that either, the agent’s requirements present invest-
ments that are too high and thus, too costly for the principal, or that an agent simply does not
need additional support to facilitate his innovative activity. Third, we show that the specific
investment dynamics are subject to the principal’s discounting of future periods’ payoffs and
the rate by which the agent’s Autonomy Support depreciates: the principal in our model be-
gins the relationship with comparably high amounts of investments if she does not discount
future periods too strongly and her support has a longer-lasting effect.
In Chapter 3, which is joint work with Markus Epp (University of Freiburg), we analyze whether
central bankers should be rewarded for keeping interest rates up and whether monetary policy
should “keep its powder dry” in anticipation of deteriorating economic conditions. These re-
quests are in contrast to the optimal monetary policy framework in typical models of macroe-
conomic stabilization, where monetary policy cannot be stored and where interest rates are
the instrument and not a goal of stabilization. Given the central bank has a dual mandate
with a certain degree of freedom in putting weights on price stability and economic activity,
our results are as follows.
First, letting a non-committing central banks’ objective function also host explicit preferences
for keeping interest rates above their natural level, the associated precautionary interest rate-
setting (PIRS) creates a dry powder paradox: incentivizing higher nominal interest rates only
leads to on average lower nominal interest rates in equilibrium. The reason is that such an in-
centive causes a deflationary bias, lowering average inflation and output gaps, which in turn
influence rational expectations strongly enough to push nominal interest rates down.
This deflationary bias, however, helps to address the time inconsistency problem, which arises
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when the central bank cannot credibly commit and the steady-state output level is distorted.
A positive incentive to keep nominal interest rates above zero counters the inflationary bias
in this case and leads to a combination of inflation and output gap that is welfare optimal for
society. We show that the optimal PIRS-weight inducing this allocation has closed-form ex-
pressions.
Although the benefits of PIRS arising from the time inconsistency problem vanish under com-
mitment, the effects imposed on average inflation by an explicit weight on keeping interest
rates above their natural level may still provide a rationale for using it. Our finding illustrates
the Fisherian nature of the long-run biases in the New Keynesian model: higher nominal in-
terest rates drive inflation in the long-run. Hence, when the objective actually is to create
some leeway away from the zero lower bound, such a reward might help to accomplish that
goal. Nevertheless, not-considering a potentially binding effective lower bound, there is no
welfare-based argument for a positive weight on keeping interest rates at higher levels. The
reason is that the ability to commit enables the central bank to overcome the time inconsis-
tency bias in the long-run without any additionally needed tools.
Further, we show how PIRS might prove to be a valuable strategy for a central bank to avoid the
scenario of "fiscal dominance", in which interest expenses of a government cannot be covered
by tax collection or rollovers quickly enough, such that a central bank would have to sacrifice




A theory of random samples and flawed
conclusions
1.1 Introduction
Dealing with uncertainty is relevant for many economic settings. Predicting the next realiza-
tion of a random process and quantifying the risk associated with this forecast is essential
for investment decisions, purchases, procurement, gambling or even getting married. In the
past, people had to rely on the auguries of higher authorities, like the Oracle of Delphi, to gain
some insight into a "God-given" future. But ever since the first developments of probability
theory in the 17th century by Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat, more and more analytical
approaches were devised.
In contrast to today’s highly sophisticated algorithms using machine learning tools handling
huge amounts of data, individuals usually have only limited information based on, for exam-
ple, their own experiences or those made by acquaintances. Alternatively, they might face
binding resource or cognitive constraints when collecting data. Hence, it is of great impor-
tance to understand how single individuals form beliefs about an uncertain future based on
limited data. In general, statistical (or econometric) theory offers ways about how to do so
in a sophisticated manner. In particular, it prescribes how to deal with the innate risk-taking
7
RANDOM ERROR NEGLECT
associated with sampling, or to be more precise, the potential perils arising when forming as-
sessments based on a limited number of data points. When using the average of a sample
to guess about a future realization, one always has to account for how reliable the calculated
sample average is. When forming beliefs based on sample data, the question is how represen-
tative the sample under consideration truly is.
If individuals are well aware of these issues and thus, form beliefs the same way a sophisticated
statistician would, their assessments concerning an uncertain future will not be systematically
flawed. However, decades of research in psychology as well as in economics have shown that
human beings tend to be "semi-sophisticated" statisticians at best (see Kahneman (2011) for
an overview). As a result, their probabilistic assessments, as well as the resulting behavior,
tend to show significant flaws. Figuring out in what way exactly individuals fail to behave
like sophisticated statisticians might thus lead to explanations for observed "misbehaving"
(Thaler and Ganser, 2015).
In this chapter, I address the question about the consequences arising if individuals overstate
the representativeness of a finite random sample, i.e. individuals neglecting the existence of
random errors associated with randomly drawn samples. I argue that, depending on the size
of the random sample, the resulting probability assessments of a Random Error Neglecting
Agent (henceforth: RENA) are severely flawed. Random error neglect implies that an agent
displays unjustifiably high trust in his estimates of the population parameters derived from
his sample data. This can be exemplified best by the famous joke statisticians frequently use
about a group of blind men who want to assess the shape of an elephant by all touching differ-
ent parts of it: all men believe in a different shape and properties of the animal, dependent on
whether a man touches just the trunk or just the abdominal parts because each of them fully
trusts his own limited experience and ignores the possibility that there is more to be known.
This chapter shows how the assumption of individuals neglecting the random error of sam-
ples causes deviations from the rational, i.e. statistically sophisticated, assessment. Further,
I delineate the extent of these deviations. I demonstrate that within this rather simple speci-
fication lies great explanatory power: the theory can serve as an endogenous explanation for
well-established empirical findings like framing effects, overconfidence of individuals in form
of overprecision, excessive distrust with respect to other people’s opinions, the disbelief in the
regression-to-the-mean phenomenon, unjustified beliefs in the persistence of trends as well
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as irrational bidding behavior in First-Price Sealed-Bid auctions. Furthermore, the theoretical
set-up is easily applicable to various other canonical economic settings considering decision
making under uncertainty.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, I present a discussion of related literature, fol-
lowed by the underlying assumptions and properties of the theory in Section 1.3. In Section
1.4, I show how naive reliance on formally unbiased estimators can lead to flawed parameter
assessments. In Section 1.5, I depict how negligence concerning the random error affects an
individual’s certainty of future outcomes when predicting the next realization of one or more
static random variables. Section 1.6 extends the analysis shown in Section 1.5 by also consid-
ering the case of predictions made via regression analysis. It exemplifies that the theory is also
applicable to dynamic random processes. Section 1.7 shows how the theory of RENA can be
applied in economic models dealing with bidding behavior in auctions. Section 1.8 concludes
the chapter.
1.2 Related Literature
While overall contributing to the vast and steadily growing literature in psychology and (be-
havioral) economics about how humans form beliefs of uncertain events and how they might
be influenced by cognitive biases, this section focuses on the areas this theory most directly
contributes to. Generally, it contributes to research conducted to evaluate how human beings’
probabilistic judgements about the future contrast with the basic implications of probability
theory (Kahneman et al., 1982; Gilovich et al., 2002).
The RENA in this model relies only on the data in his own sample to predict future outcomes.
Hence, the theory is in line with findings psychological literature emphasizing how individ-
ual’s probabilistic beliefs are driven by observed frequencies (Dougherty et al., 1999; Sieck
and Yates, 2001; Nilsson et al., 2005).
The literature most closely related to this theory is the one analyzing the "Law of Small Num-
bers" and the associated gambler’s fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Rapoport and Bude-
scu, 1997; Mullainathan, 2002; Rabin, 2002; Rabin and Vayanos, 2010). This brand of research
states that individuals know the true data-generating-process (DGP) and believe that its stochas-
tic characteristics will be present and reflected in all (small) samples. As a result, individuals
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are prone to believe in the "Law of Averages" (Ellenberg, 2014, p. 73): they discount the likeli-
hood of observing unlikely events because they think unlikely events will always average out,
even in the short run. Take the example of multiple flips of a fair coin: after observing five coin
flips in a row resulting in heads, an individual who is subject to the gambler’s fallacy believes
the next toss yields tails with significantly higher probability than heads. Thus, such an indi-
vidual knows the true probability distribution and draws flawed conclusions concerning the
possible shape of random samples.
The approach presented here follows a related logic in the sense that individuals behave like
all samples fully represent the distribution they were drawn from. However, the thought pro-
cess and direction of inference are completely reversed: in my approach, the agent does not
know the true DGP and its properties. All he knows is his sample data. His error then results
from false extrapolation: the agent believes that the population’s parameters cannot differ
from those he calculated with the help of his random sample. Hence, the individual’s mistake
lies in the inferences he makes about the properties of the DGP, not vice versa. Additionally, in
my approach, the actual significance of an agent’s fallacy is dependent on the actual sample
size which is unaccounted for by the theory of the "Law of Small Numbers".
Furthermore, the implications I derive are fully in line with Tversky and Kahneman (1974),
stating that individuals appear to be insensitive to the fact that random variation is depen-
dent on the sample size when comparing the informativeness of two samples with different
size. Nevertheless, the context considered here is different. In this approach, no difference in
informativeness between samples is evaluated. In fact, the RENA behaves as if no other sam-
ple but his own exists.
In a broader sense, this approach also contributes to the literature of Anchoring (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974) and, similarly, the central tendency bias (Crosetto et al., 2020). Gen-
erally speaking, both theories state that individuals tend to stick too much to their initial best
guesses, for example, of the mean, and then fail to adjust their judgement sufficiently away
from it. The theory of the RENA can be interpreted as providing a rationale on why people ap-
pear like they tend to focus “too much” on their initial estimates (here: their point predictor)
and what might determine the extent of this bias. In this sense, this theory can serve as an




Further, this approach contributes to the extensive literature about overprecision as a form of
Overconfidence (Moore et al., 2015; Simon and Kim, 2017). Overprecision has been used as
an explanation for empirical findings/patterns in, for example, political decision making (Or-
toleva and Snowberg, 2015), asset valuation and trading decisions at the stock market (Odean,
1999) or managerial behavior (Simon and Houghton, 2003; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). This
theory contributes to this body of literature by offering an endogenous explanation not only
for observations in line with this bias but also its origins. In this approach, overprecision does
not arise from motivational factors like wishful thinking, which is in line with existing evi-
dence (Logg et al., 2018). Neither does it arise due to the use of a biased estimation strategy
concerning the data variability of a population (Kareev et al., 2002), for which the empirical
findings are mixed (Kaesler et al., 2016). Rather, it may be a symptom originating in judge-
ments suffering from negligence with respect to the random error.
1.3 The Random Error Neglecting Agent
The theory considered in this chapter specifies how an agent suffering from random (or sam-
pling) error neglect forms a belief about the likelihood of a future event under uncertainty. I
simply assume that an agent wants to make a probabilistic assessment as correctly as possi-
ble. No other preferences will be modeled explicitly, i.e. no explicit utility function is derived.
In contrast to the model of fully rational agents which are most prominent in economic mod-
els, I assume that no agent has a perfect understanding of the underlying DGP and its param-
eters, be it the first and second moment of a probability distribution or the slope and intercept
parameters of a regression function. The majority of situations in reality do not allow for per-
fect knowledge of the underlying distribution. Hence, the more realistic scenario is when the
true DGP is unknown, or even cannot be known by a single agent. It is more interesting to
consider how predictions based on random samples are forged since inferences, as well as
forecasts, are generally derived by using limited data collected from the unobservable true
distribution.
Thus, throughout this chapter, it is assumed that individuals do not perfectly understand all
properties of a random variable X , i.e. its exact distribution and the respective parameters.
They only consider a finite random sample, consisting of n fully random draws from this dis-
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tribution. This sample is denoted by G = {A1, ..., An}, with Ai representing a discrete data point
of sample G .
Note that I do not make an explicit assumption about where G actually comes from. One pos-
sible source might be the notion of Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) who use a purely "mental
model" originating from Kahana (2014). It states that in their long run memory, individuals
are capable of storing the true DGP. However, when making decisions, people rely on their op-
erative or short-term memory which only has a bounded capacity due to cognitive limitations
or external factors like time constraints. Thus, coming back to the model in this chapter, you
could think of the random sampling process as being purely "mental" in this case. In con-
trast to Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010), this sampling process is not spoiled by a perceptive bias
that lets the agent consider only specific data points. In my case, the likelihood of a discrete
outcome to be considered by the agent depends only on its true probability of realization.
Another way to interpret this model’s set-up would be to think of an agent who actually has
access to physical data in form of a random sample that he or somebody else has drawn from
the population he does not or cannot know without incurring prohibitively high cost. Never-
theless, even though both notions appear rather different, the important point in both cases is
that the agent does not suffer from any perception bias and thus, does not deliberately under-
weight or ignore some realizations. Thus, his sample can be considered to be fully randomly
drawn from the population.
I further assume that individuals are capable of always applying the best possible estimation
strategy for a problem in hand. In other words, they use the same estimation strategy as a
sophisticated statistician who knows and understands the respective theoretical background
perfectly. This implies, for example, the use of unbiased maximum likelihood estimators for
making guesses about a distribution’s parameters like mean and variance which in turn will
then be used to predict a future outcome and its certainty. This setting serves the purpose to
eliminate the simple use of heuristics or biased estimation strategies as potential drivers for
the presented results.1 The used optimal estimation strategies depend on the specific context
and thus, will be stated explicitly in the following sections.
1 There is an ongoing debate about whether individuals use biased estimation strategies. For example, in the
psychological literature, it is frequently postulated that individuals systematically underestimate the true
Variance of a Random variable (Kareev et al., 2002). However, the evidence for this claim is rather mixed and
not conclusive (Konovalova and Le Mens, 2018).
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So far, there is no difference between the assessment strategy of a rational, i.e. statistically
sophisticated, agent considering a sample and the one of a RENA. However, the way how both
kinds of agents treat and understand their estimates once they are calculated is different. The
crucial assumption here is that the statistically sophisticated agent understands that her es-
timators are random variables: their exact realization depends on the specific sample data
drawn from the population. Thus, those estimates follow their own distribution with their
own dispersion, implying uncertainty that needs to be accounted for when using them for
making statistical inferences. Take, for example, the simple case of a normally distributed
random variable X with mean µ and variance σ2. When estimating the mean of X , the max-
imum likelihood estimator is the arithmetic mean of a random sample, i.e. m = 1n
∑n
i=1 Ai .
The sample mean m, however, is not a constant value, but normally distributed with mean µ
and variance σ
2
n . Its variance term captures the random error, the potential variations in the
realizations of m for different samples.
The RENA, however, naively thinks that his assessments of the parameters based on the sam-
ple data are equivalent to the true population parameters. Hence, he is either assumed to be
not capable or just to be too ignorant to understand the statistical property that a random
sample (with specific parameters) is not a perfect representation of the underlying popula-
tion’s distribution. In other words, he is negligent about the random error innate in estimates
established via limited data. Statistically speaking, he confuses unbiasedness with correct-
ness. This is per se problematic because unbiasedness does not mean that every single indi-
vidual’s guess is correct.2 It just means that on average, this estimator will yield the true value.
The RENA, however, falsely relies on his estimates as if they had no variability when forming
an opinion about the likelihood of an outcome. In the context of the example from above, the
RENA does not understand that m has a variance σ
2
n which is larger than zero for finite n. One
can think of this type of agent as some naive individual who just has read about optimal esti-
mation strategies and wants to apply them to a data set without understanding the statistical
properties of the methods.




1.4 General problems of confusing random variables with constants
One could be tempted to think that when agents are using the maximum likelihood estimator,
i.e. the best possible estimator, and the true parameters are not or cannot be known, they use
the "second-best option" available and thus, the RENAs behavior and drawn inferences are al-
ways indistinguishable from those of a fully rational individual who is using limited data from
a random sample {A1, ...., An}. However, as I show in this section, this logic is only partially
correct. Consider a random variable X that is normally distributed with mean µ and variance
σ2. The ML estimator of µ in this case is the sample mean, i.e. m = 1n
∑n
i=1 Ai . As a result,
when just estimating the true mean, neither type of agent makes a systematic/biased estima-
tion since E(m) = µ. Another way to phrase this is that both, the estimates of large groups
of RENAs in which the individuals aggregate all available information from the idiosyncratic
samples should be as correct as those made by a large group of fully rational agents. This re-
sult, however, does not hold generally for all estimations made by using m:
Proposition 1
Consider the case in which a RENA makes an estimate not based on the sample mean m
but on a function f(m).
1. If f(m) is linear, the RENA’s estimate is still correct on average.
2. If f(m) is strictly convex or strictly concave, the RENA’s estimate is systematically biased.
Proposition 1 shows a potential problem: what if the agents are tasked with making an esti-
mation based on a function f of their sample mean, instead of just estimating µ via m?
Given f is linear, the unbiasedness result still applies.3 If, on the other hand, f is strictly con-
vex or strictly concave, this result no longer holds. As Jensen’s inequality (Jensen, 1906) states,
if f is strictly concave, E( f (X )) < f (E(X )) holds for X being a random variable, and vice versa,
for f being strictly convex, E( f (X )) > f (E(X )). Thus, applying non-linear functions to random
variables is non-trivial concerning biasedness.
The RENA, however, is ignorant about this property because he is ignorant about his estimate
being a random variable. He believes that his sample estimate is equivalent to the true pa-
3 It can be shown that for any linear function f , E [ f (m)] = f (E [m]) = f (µ) (Fahrmeir et al., 2016).
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rameter of the distribution since he neglects the random error. Thus, he falsely believes that
applying a function to his estimate is equivalent to applying a function to a constant with no
variation. Hence, when tasked with making a statistical inference by using a non-linear func-
tion of, for example, the sample mean, his estimate will be biased on average.
In contrast, the rational agent will not make such a mistake because she is aware of the above-
stated statistical property.
This finding has two implications. First, it shows a limit to the phenomenon called "Wisdom
of the Crowds" (WotC). WotC states that collecting information from various individuals can-
cels individual noise and leads to on average correct assessments and improved decisions,
especially in comparison to choices made by a single decision maker (Surowiecki, 2005). For
a group of individuals consisting of RENAs, however, this only holds for as long as the task
in hand does not require the use of non-linear functions of their sample estimates. Else, the
group’s assessment will be systematically biased.
Second, related to the first point, this theory shows a potential channel about how framing
effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1989; Paese et al., 1993) concerning the specific way a ques-
tion is asked may affect a decision maker. My theory states that two different questions both
requiring the use of the same estimate may lead to different results with respect to average
correctness of the responses. Consider the stylistic example in which question 1 asks: "What
is the average return per month of Stock X?" while question 2 asks: "How many months will
you on average have to hold Stock X to collect an overall return of B?" Given a finite sample
of monthly returns for Stock X, the arithmetic mean is an unbiased estimator of the required
mean rate of return and hence, a RENA’s answer to question 1 will on average be correct. The
second question, however, leads the agent to use the inverse of the arithmetic mean, which is
a strictly convex function. Thus, a RENA’s answer to question 2 will be on average too high, i.e.
on average, the amount of months necessary will not be estimated correctly.
Hence, even without the necessity of stimulating an emotional response (Cassotti et al., 2012)
or the use the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Folkes, 1988), this theory




1.5 Flawed Conclusions about the Predictability of the Future
In this section, I show how the RENA’s probabilistic assessment of a future realization of one
or more random variables differs from the one made by a rational agent. In some sense, it is an
extension to the previous section, where the results followed from agents using their estimated
mean rate to answer specific questions about the central-tendency parameter of an unknown
distribution, or, in other words, about the average outcome of a future random draw.
In contrast, the focus in this section lies on interval predictions, used to quantify the degree
of uncertainty associated with an unbiased point predictor as the sample mean. There are
several reasons for making this distinction. First, the true likelihood that a future realization
of a continuously distributed random variable hits exactly its true mean value is equal to zero
(given a non-zero population dispersion). Hence, some degree of uncertainty always needs to
be accounted for.
Second, for some discrete distributions, the mean itself will never be an actual realization (for
example, when rolling a dice). Hence, just relying on point predictions when forecasting the
future is unsophisticated in most cases.
Considering a random sample drawn from the true distribution with sample size n > 1, it
appears only reasonable that even the RENA who believes the sample to contain all neces-
sary/available information will notice these uncertainties for his calculated mean rate, at least
to some degree. The question then is, if and how much the assessment of a RENA about the
uncertainty of his predictions differs from the one of a rational agent. An intuitive way to show
those differences is to compare the respective average prediction errors both types of agents
calculate. Those are an integral component for, e.g., the specification of all kinds of certainty
intervals. Thus, another way of depicting the different assessments would be to show discrep-
ancies in the calculation of the bounds of such intervals.
Confidence vs. Prediction Intervals
It is important to note at this point that, when speaking of certainty intervals in this context, I
generally refer to prediction intervals (PIs), or as they are sometimes called coverage intervals
(Vardeman, 1992; Poulson et al., 1997). The reason for using this type of interval instead of
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the more famous confidence interval (CI) in this context is that when dealing with an uncer-
tain outcome of a future event, the primary goal is not to establish confidence bounds for the
estimates of the parameters of a distribution. Given a sample mean m, when predicting the
future, there is only limited insight in knowing the degree of certainty by which this sample-
specific estimate captures the true mean.
A prediction interval on the other hand gives information about a range of values, the next ob-
servation will fall in at a given degree of certainty. Specifically, a 95% PI centered at the sample
mean m states a 95% likelihood that the value drawn next from the same distribution will be
contained in this interval. For further clarification of the differences, consider the following
exemplary question. Assume you want to predict the time you need to go to work the next
day based on your collected data from the last months. A confidence interval only tells you
that your true average travel time lies – for a given level of certainty – between X and Y min-
utes. A prediction interval on the other hand will tell that the next trip will take between X and
Y minutes for a given level of certainty. Hence, it is logical to use a PI instead of a CI in this
context.
1.5.1 Overoptimism concerning own predictions
First, I show how a RENA’s uncertainty-assessment is flawed when predicting the next real-
ization of a single random variable, even though he uses an unbiased estimator as a point
predictor.
Consider a random variable X that follows a normal distribution with mean µ and variance
σ2. The first parameter refers to the central tendency, the second one to the dispersion of the
distribution. Further, assume a random sample drawn from this distribution consisting of n
points of data. The task is to make a prediction for the next draw from this distribution, i.e.
the value of An+1 and to specify the associated prediction error. How does the assessment of





Given that X ∼ N (µ,σ2) and {A1, ..., An} is a fully randomly drawn sample consisting of n
realizations of X . In this case, the RENA underestimates the true prediction error for the





I assume here that the RENA makes no systematic estimation mistake for the first and second
moment of the distribution. He always uses the best possible unbiased estimator as a founda-
tion for his predictions. Thus, he calculates his sample mean according to m = 1n
∑n
i=1 Ai and
the sample dispersion according to s2 = 1n−1
∑n
i=1(Ai −m)2. Hence, on average, neither mean
nor variance will be systematically over- or underestimated.4
The problem is, however, that he believes that all relevant information is contained in his ran-
dom sample. In other words, he believes he considers the whole data dispersion when in fact
he only has an estimate in form of the sample dispersion. Since in his opinion, there is no
other source of uncertainty in this case, he believes his prediction error to be just s2. Or to
phrase it differently, he believes that any future draw An+1 has a mean m and a variance s2.
As a result, on average, the RENA’s belief about the prediction error is equal to E [s2] =σ2. This
assessment, however, contains the problem: the RENA does not think about m and s2 as sam-
ple dependent random variables but as constants.
A rational agent, when using the same sample for a prediction of the next random draw from
this population while not knowing its true parameters will not only consider the randomness
coming from the population dispersion (σ2, or its estimate s2). She will also incorporate the
random error coming from the estimate itself : when using m as the center of a prediction,
you have to account for the fact that it is a random variable following its own distribution and
having its own variation. If X ∼ N (µ,σ2), then m ∼ N (µ, σ2n ). This implies that the lower the
sample size under consideration is, the more likely are substantial deviations from the true
population characteristic, which carry over to forecasts made on this foundation.
Hence, as shown in von Auer (2005), the true uncertainty is captured by the variance of the
point prediction, i.e. V ar [m − An+1]. As is shown in Appendix (A.1), this true variance for a




. By comparison, it follows that
4 The proof of unbiasedness for both estimators is omitted here but can be found in any introductory statistics
book, for example, Fahrmeir et al. (2016).
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the true average prediction error is larger than the average of the RENA’s assessment5 by a fac-
tor n+1n > 1, proving Proposition 2.
Thus, the smaller the sample size, the stronger is the effect of neglecting the random error and
the more error prone are the probabilistic inferences drawn by the RENA. Generally speaking,
for any finite n > 1, the RENA believes the future to be more predictable than is statistically jus-
tifiable because he neglects a significant source of the prediction error in form of the random
error contained in his sample estimates. This neglect would, for example, manifest in Pre-
diction Interval bounds being calculated too narrowly. Hence, they will differ from the ones
made by a rational agent by
√
1+ 1n , which can be quite significant given n is not too large.6
To phrase it differently, for finite sample sizes, a RENA suffers from overprecision (Bazerman
and Moore, 2012; Moore and Schatz, 2017), which in this context means that the RENA has
statistically unjustified confidence about his knowledge of the outcomes of random events.
This result yields direct implications to various fields of economics dealing with decision mak-
ing under uncertainty. A prominent example is contract theory, dealing with the optimal de-
sign of incentive schemes by a principal who requires an agent to complete a given task. The
result presented above implies that efficient incentivization for a non-risk-neutral agent to ex-
ert effort when the outcome is uncertain requires more than knowledge about the agent’s true
degree of risk tolerance or aversion. In the standard case (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, Chapter
7), the optimal "pay-for-performance" rate for a risk-averse agent does not only depend on his
effort cost function and his degree of risk-aversion but also on the variation of the outcome.
If the agent is a RENA, in addition to being risk-averse, his judgement of the uncertainty is
flawed and the risk is underestimated. Thus, even though he is risk-averse, this theory states
that an agent who neglects random errors in his probabilistic assessments is willing to accept
more convex incentivization schemes and thus a higher risk than standard theory would sug-
gest. In line with e.g. Silver (2012), this theory thus states that overprecision may take shape in
form of understatements of risk and a failure of self-protection against it by decision makers,
like managers or investors.
5 The use of a biased estimator for the population variance, i.e. s′2 = 1n
∑n
i=1(Ai −m), only amplifies this result.
6 See Geisser (1993) on the correct specification of interval bounds for Prediction Intervals given population
mean and variance are unknown.
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1.5.2 Inordinate Scepticism concerning different views
The overprecision problem shown in the previous section, however, does not hold universally.
Interestingly, it is only present when it comes to the evaluation of the own prediction’s accu-
racy. When being tasked with the evaluation of a forecast provided, for example, by another
agent, the theory states that the RENA will suffer from exactly the opposite problem:
Proposition 3
Assume that a RENA is provided with an exogenously derived predictor z for the next real-
ization of X . In this case, the RENA overestimates the true prediction error of z on average
by a factor nn−1 .
Proposition 3 states that the RENA will on average overestimate the prediction error of a
forecast not made by himself. In other words, he will be unjustifiably sceptic about the accu-
racy of such a predictor.
To see this, assume that there exists an independent point predictor z to be evaluated. The
agent has no information about how and on what basis z has been calculated, he just takes
it as externally determined.7 Further, as he believes to have calculated the true parameters
already, he does not adjust his own prediction but just evaluates the likelihood – or error – of
the external prediction by comparing it to the data points in his sample.
Appendix (A.2) shows that, as a result, the RENA on average underestimates the reliability of
z by a factor nn−1 in comparison to the correct evaluation. Again, especially for small n, this
can be a quite significant deviation. It follows that the bounds of his intervals specified for
z are too broadly calculated, in other words, he suffers from underprecision in this case. The
reason for this result lies in the fact that his neglect of the random error in his estimation of the
sample-moments, being the main driver for overprecision in the previous section, now works
as a counter-effect for his belief in the accuracy of z. To phrase it differently: Because the RENA
is too optimistic about his own prediction’s accuracy, he is excessively pessimistic concerning
7 Note further, that this also implies that no additional assumption about the quality of an externally provided
predictor is made, i.e. the quality of the results does not depend on the actual "correctness" of z. You could
for example assume, that an expert’s assessment is significantly closer to the true parameterµ than a random
guess provided by an individual totally unfamiliar with the problem in hand. The RENA, however, does not
attach any weight for – potentially spurious – competence.
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those made by others.
Stating this testable hypothesis about how different individuals treat a prediction made by
themselves in contrast to those made by other agents, for example, their colleagues/other
team-members, this theory also contributes to the economic literature regarding how agents
perceive and evaluate the opinion/advice stated by others and how they update their beliefs
thereupon (Harvey and Fischer, 1997; Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006). There is robust evidence
that individuals tend to rely more on their own assessments and show higher doubt with re-
spect to the judgmental accuracy of third party advisors (Van Swol and Sniezek, 2005; Gino
and Schweitzer, 2008; Mannes, 2009). The most prevalent explanation attempts to explain
this phenomenon relies on various forms of "personal motivation", for example, whether a
decision maker is "powerful" (Tost et al., 2012), whether there exists some kind of personal
bond between the decision maker and the other agent (Kadous et al., 2013) or whether this
mindset is subconsciously created to sustain a feeling of one’s superiority over another per-
son, maybe even an expert. This theory offers a different explanation of why individuals may
devaluate other people’s beliefs that is not routed in motivational reasons: simply because
people have too much faith in their own sparse data. They just do not take into account that
their results might be random and there is more to be known.
1.5.3 The case of two random variables: inaccurate assessment of (future) differences
So far, I have only considered predictions made for the next realization of a single static ran-
dom variable. The theoretical approach presented in this chapter, however, can easily be ex-
tended to the case in which an agent has the objective of assessing the differences of two
distributions’ properties as a foundation for a decision to be taken. Consider, for example, a
manager whose goal it is to access the superiority of a product’s quality over another. This can
be the case in a pharmaceutical context, when a decision has to be made about what specific
medication yields superior results. It also might be a provider of an internet platform who
wants to evaluate the effectiveness of a newly adopted merchandising method concerning
changes in user behavior.8
In both cases, it is important to estimate the first and the second moments of the respective
8 Statistically speaking, a case like the first example is considered to be an independent two-sample test, the
latter a dependent (paired) two-sample test (Imbens and Rubin, 2015).
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distributions correctly in order to figure out potentially significant differences in the means of
both distributions. Furthermore, it is vital to calculate the bounds of future mean-differences
for future samplings, for example, conducted by a regulatory agency or simply the next cus-
tomer who compares two goods produced by different firms (Hahn, 1977). Thus, in terms of
prediction, the task in hand is to establish the upper and/or lower bounds which contain the
future difference in (mean-)performance with a (reasonably) high certainty level.
Consider the case of two potentially related random variables X and Y , for example, the qual-
ities of two products, which are normally distributed with given means and variances, i.e. X ∼
NX (µX ,σ2X ) and Y ∼ NY (µY ,σ2Y ). The co-variance between the two variables is denoted by
σX ,Y . 9
The RENA thinks about both distributions only in the form of two randomly drawn samples.
Each sample is drawn from the two distributions, respectively. For the sake of simplicity, it is
assumed that both samples have the same size n. Let G1 = {A1, A2, ...An} be the sample drawn
from NX and G2 = {B1,B2, ...,Bn} from NY . As before, the RENA is fully capable of calculat-
ing the arithmetic means and sample standard deviations accurately and without bias. Let
them be denoted as (mX , sX ) for the first and (mY , sY ) for the second sample. Comparing both
sample means (mX −mY ) yields again an unbiased estimator for the true mean difference
(µX −µY ).
However, the negligence concerning the random error, now present for both samples under
consideration, again leads to flawed conclusions for the RENA:
Proposition 4
1. Assume that µX >µY . Given that the distance between both means is not too high, there
is a statistically significant chance that a RENA will be certain that µY >µX .
2. Assume that µX = µY = 0. Then, on average, the RENA will expect at least one mean to
be significantly larger than zero, given the sample size n is not too large.
3. On average, the RENA underestimates the true prediction error of his forecast based on









First, Proposition 4 states that due to mY and mX being random variables and given that there
exist a sufficiently large range of values covered by both distributions,10 there is a significant
chance that a RENA will hold false beliefs about what average is higher. To state it intuitively
by using the example from above in which an agent wants to find out which of two products
has superior quality: there is a positive probability that he is certain that the product with
lower average-quality is superior.
Second, using this example further, Proposition 4 states that there is a significant chance that
the RENA will expect an average quality of one of the goods that is exaggeratedly high, given
the samples are not too large. To show this, consider the case in which µx = µy = 0. Further,
for simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that σ2X = σ2Y = 1, i.e. both products are
qualitatively equivalent because both variables follow a standard normal distribution. This
implies that both of the RENA’s mean estimates, mX and mY , are random variables that follow
the same normal distributions, which is N (0, 1n ). Hence, just comparing the two arithmetic
means of the two samples is like conducting two independent random draws from the same
distribution. Finding the highest mean is then statistically equivalent to finding the largest of
two order statistics for this distribution. Using the approximation formula by Blom (1958) to
calculate the respective expected value,11 the expected mean of the highest of the two order




cially for small n, it is significantly higher than zero, the true average value of both random
variables. Note, however, that this result does not contradict the statement of unbiasedness
from before. The reason lies in the fact that the theory just states, that one of the products
can falsely be judged superior, not that it has to be always the same product for all agents.12 A
RENA will expect a higher quality of one of the products than would be justified in this case.
Hence, the final realization is likely to lead to some kind of "disappointment".
Third, Proposition 4 states that a RENA ignores the potential fluctuations in the difference of
sample means. As a result, his predictive inference again suffers from overprecision in the
sense that he underestimates the prediction error of his forecast based on mX −mY . In com-
10 I.e. µi ±µ j ≤ 3σi , i , j ∈ {X ,Y } and j 6= i .
11 Explicitly given for a random variable X following a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2 by
µ+Φ−1 ( r−αN−2α+1 )σ, with N being the sample size, r the r th largest order statistic and α being set equal to
0.375.
12 In fact, the symmetry of the Normal distribution at hand guarantees that when aggregating all samples of all
RENAs, these misestimations will cancel out perfectly.
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parison to the prediction problem with only one random outcome the overprecision problem
even increases because in this case, the RENA suffers from an increased effect of the random
error neglect. As is shown in Appendix (A.3), under the simplifying assumption of equal vari-
ances of the two random variables, this implies that the miscalculation of the prediction error
by the RENA is on average exactly twice as high as in the previous section. Speaking in terms
of Statistical Intervals: to calculate the upper and lower bound of a prediction interval, the
RENA will on average use a correction factor that is too small and needs to be multiplied by√
2 (n+1)n .
Generally speaking, he specifies prediction intervals too narrowly and thus, exhibits too much
confidence in the predictive power of his initial point-estimate of the mean-differences. Hence,
this theoretical set-up postulates that agents who suffer from random error neglect tend not
only to perceive but also to predict significant differences in outcomes/products more often
than it would be statistically justified. Especially in combination with the possible assessment
errors of the true parameters outlined above, this may lead to seriously flawed conclusions.
To illustrate that point, suppose the most extreme case of a RENA with n = 1, meaning that
both samples consist of only one random draw (i.e. G1 = A1 and G2 = B1). Neglecting the fact
that these are only samples of the true populations, the RENA believes that the two data points
are the only realizations possible. He calculates mX = A1, mY = B1 and sX = sY = 0.
Assuming that both random variables follow a continuous (normal) distribution, the likeli-
hood of A1 = B1 is equal to zero. As a result, such a RENA will always believe that (significant)
differences between the two variables (for example, product qualities) exist and will exist in
all future samples. In other words, not only is a RENA in danger of rejecting the hypothe-
sis "µX −µY = 0" too often, he also falsely believes that mean-differences measured in future
samples will resemble his own estimate for this difference (mX −mY ) too strongly.
Such kind of overoptimism offers an explanation for, e.g., unjustified beliefs of economic
agents in a product’s superiority in quality (Spiller and Belogolova, 2017) or the persistence
of gender-stereotypes/social norms (Bursztyn et al., 2018)
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1.6 RENAs and Regression Analysis: False Faith in Trends
In the previous section, I focused on prediction problems concerning the next realization of
one or two static random variables. In this section, I demonstrate that the theory of the RENA
can also be applied for predictions made via regression analysis, especially time-series fore-
casts.
It is important to consider this area because, especially in business, when predicting, for ex-
ample, the quarterly sales of a company, it is not only important to understand the factors
influencing the outcome under consideration but also to what extent they do. Further, con-
sidering predictions of ex-ante unknown outcomes, it is often vital to specify the degree of
certainty by which the estimated connection will uphold, or particularly, considering time-
series analysis, how time-persistent it will be. Using this prediction method is particularly
appealing because as Jayachandran (1983) or Box et al. (2015) show, autoregressive processes
of the form xt = ρxt−1 + εt , with |ρ| < 1 and x0 = 0, can also be expressed in form of a linear
regression model. Hence, the following section can be seen as an extension of the previously
presented theory to prediction tasks considering the next outcomes of stochastic processes,
too.
Assume that the true relationship between an outcome variable y and a predictor/explanatory
variable x is captured by a simple linear regression model (Angrist and Pischke, 2008):13
yt =α+βxt +εt (1.1)
where t ∈N is the (time-)index for a specific pair of observations (yt , xt ) and their correspond-
ing error term εt . α denotes the intercept, β the slope parameter. For (1.1) being the true
model, I implicitly assume that no relevant predictor variables are missing, xt itself is not ir-
relevant for explaining movements in yt , the relationship between (yt , xt ) indeed is linear and
α and β are constants for all observations. The reason to include a random error term in
equation (1.1) even if it depicts the correct model is to account for unforeseeable (economic)
shocks or idiosyncratic unobservables for an individual measurement. I assume that the error
13 Even though the model here appears to be rather simplistic, the same analysis can be replicated by using a
regression model with multiple explanatory variables, including, for example, a simple trend variable t or a
quadratic term. The results presented do not change, they only become more distinct. Hence, for the sake
of simplicity, I use the most basic version for my analysis.
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terms εt are normally distributed with zero mean, are not auto-correlated, are unrelated to
the predictor variables and all have a constant variance equal to σ2. In line with the previous
analysis, the RENA does not know the true model but relies on a finite sample of size T for his
estimates that is drawn fully randomly. Further, I again assume that he makes no systematic
estimation mistake, i.e. uses the best-possible estimation method for the task in hand. Thus,
in this case, he is assumed to use the Ordinary-Least-Squares (OLS) method to estimate the
parameters α and β. Formally, he chooses his parameter estimates α̂ and β̂ to minimize the






t=1(yt − α̂− β̂xt )2. As shown in Rao (2009), the OLS
is the Best Unbiased Estimator given the assumptions made above. Hence, the agent does not
miss-specify the real model (for example, assuming a linear regression while the true relation
is non-linear), nor does his forecasting model suffer from overfitting.14 Further, potential mis-
takes in prediction do not stem from the use of a biased estimator or a distorted sampling
process but are solely based on random error neglect. Again, a problem arises due to the fact
that, even though he realizes that there is a certain dispersion or error in his sample (here de-
picted by the residuals et = yt − ŷt , with ŷt = α̂+ β̂xt ), he fails to understand that his estimates
α̂ and β̂ are random variables, following own distributions.15 Since their value depends on the
specific sample realizations, they are likely to differ for each random sample. This, however, is
neglected by the RENA since he thinks he captured the true model parameters. In other words,
he assumes that he fully understands the slope and the intercept for the relation of regressand
(y) and predictor (x) and all uncertainty concerning future-predictions comes from individual
random errors.
Again, he assumes his sample to represent all relevant properties, thus, he believes the vari-
ance of the residuals in his sample to be equal to the true dispersion of individual errors. As
in previous sections, I again assume that he captures the sample-error dispersion via an unbi-




T−2 (von Auer, 2005). It may appear debatable that the agent is assumed to be sophis-
ticated enough to understand that he has to control for degrees of freedom for an unbiased
14 This term captures the problem of fitting the model more to the noise in the sample than to the real rela-
tionship. Generally speaking, an analysis suffers from overfitting if it corresponds too closely to a particular
sample set of data (for example, assuming too many explanatory variables to specify a regression function
that captures all data points with no residual error). Thus, it may fail to predict new observations reliably
(Backhaus et al., 2006).


















estimation while in all other aspects, he neglects the sample properties. Nevertheless, the rea-
son I chose this set-up follows the same logic as already outlined above. In particular, using a
biased variant like s2b =
∑T
t=1 et
T only leads to the agent systematically underestimating the real
dispersion of error terms, which in turn only leads to further strengthening the results.
Now, think of an agent whose task it is to make a prediction for a new outcome yT+1 for the
relationship in place, given a certain value of xT+1.16 Once more, the goal is to compare the
reliability of a forecast made by a RENA with the sophisticated (rational) approach.
Proposition 5
The RENA underestimates the true error for a prediction made via regression analysis to
forecast the next outcome yT+1 based on xT+1 by a factor
(





The RENA bases his predictions on α̂ and β̂ while accounting for a possible error term. He
believes his possible prediction error just to be equal to his assessment of dispersion in error
terms s2 since all other sources of error are neglected by him. As a result, on average, a RENA
will consider the prediction error to be equal to E(s2) =σ2. In other words, while he accounts
for the possibility that in his prediction for yT+1 (given by α̂+ β̂xT+1 + εT+1) the error term
might take a value different from zero, he neglects the fact that both parameter estimates,
even though they are unbiased, might differ from the true values.
The sophisticated calculation, however, accounts for that. As is shown in the Appendix (A.4),










which proves Proposition 5.
In contrast to the RENA assessment, expression (1.2) shows the dependency of the true predic-
tion error on sample size as well as on the dispersion of the predictor-realizations. A prediction
can be considered more reliable, if the number of observations (T ) and the squared dispersion
16 Note that this forecasting procedure is called "Ex-post forecasting". "Ex- ante forecasting" refers to xT+1 as
unknown and to be predicted as well (Armstrong, 2001). Since the latter case only increases the uncertainty




Figure 1.6.1: Simulated Prediction Intervals with T = 20, σ= 16, α= 100 and β= 5.5.
around the sample mean,
∑T
t=1(xt − x̄)2, are large. Further, this expression shows that the un-
certainty of the prediction for yT+1 increases quadratically, the more distinct the respective
predictor variable xT+1 is from the realizations within the sample. Intuitively speaking, one
can be less certain of one’s prediction when one leaves the center of information one’s esti-
mates are based on. Speaking in terms of boundaries of prediction intervals of a given level of
significance, the bounds for a prediction of yT+1 resemble parabolas with a vertex at x̄.
The problem is that the RENA does not account for either of these sources of uncertainty. Not
only does he underestimate the prediction error because the random error is neglected, he
also ignores the issue of predicting a value that relies on a predictor far away from x̄, for exam-
ple, a prognosis referring to an outcome lying far in the future. As he believes to capture the
model accurately and his parameter estimates are constants, there is no reason to believe that
this will change, even for rather extreme predictors. Again referring to the subject of predic-
tion intervals: the bounds of certainty of which he believes contain a future value yT+1 given
xT+1 at a given level of confidence are not only too small, they can be represented as straight
lines running parallel to the estimated regression line. How large the discrepancies can actu-
ally be is graphically captured in Figure 1.6.1.
Hence, the consequence is an even stronger overprecision than in the sections before: it also
increases the more distant xT+1 is from the sample mean of the explanatory variable. This is
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of particular importance in the context of a time-series analysis: the further away in the future
a prediction based on a sample of current data lies, the more uncertainty must be taken into
account. The RENA, however, does not account for the increased uncertainty.
This has some notable consequences. Especially for a small amount of data, a RENA exhibits
faith in his trend-forecasts based on his estimates that is not statistically (and hence, not ratio-
nally) justifiable. Thus, such individuals are prone to fall for e.g. the hot hand fallacy (Gilovich
et al., 1985; Barberis and Thaler, 2003) stating that humans tend to believe that a sequence
of observed successes (basketball shots by a player, portfolio choices of an investor, etc.) is
likely to be followed by another success. To phrase it differently, this theory states that peo-
ple are prone to neglect the phenomenon called regression towards the mean first postulated
by Galton (1886). Loosely speaking, this phenomenon refers to the fact that future (long-run)
observations can tend towards the true mean of a stochastic process when current (small sam-
ple) measurements may show rather extreme realizations (i.e., outliers) due to randomness.
As Siegel (2015) shows, this phenomenon is, for example, observable for stock returns which
may show great volatility in the short run, with some being significantly above, others signif-
icantly below average, but are rather stable/similar in the long run. A RENA, however, is not
able to account for such smoothing in the long run because he considers his sample (and his
estimated parameters) to contain the ultimate truth about the respective connection. Hence,
he perceives the concept of a less volatile long run and a (more or less) stable conversion as
rather unlikely or implausible.17
To put this result in an economic context: managers using time-series-regression analysis
while suffering from the random error neglect will be exceedingly in danger of perceiving
the future rather as a replication of past events, ignoring that those particular events will –
with great likelihood – not occur again. Relying too much on a small set of (time-series) data
might provide a rationale for predictions like "There is no reason why anyone would want a
computer in their home", made in 1977 by Ken Olson, the Co-Founder and President of Dig-
ital Entertainment Corporation (Stansberry, 2011), just a few years ahead of IBM introducing
their first versions of personal computers and becoming undisputed market leaders. Another
even more well-known example is the famous economist Robert Malthus who predicted in the




18th century that in the future, food shortage and misery for mankind are inevitable (Malthus,
1798). Even though the trends at that time appeared to be supportive of Malthus’ argument
(linearly growing GDP while exponential population growth), that trend broke (in fact even
reversed for many western civilizations) due to, for example, the industrialization in the cen-
turies after Malthus’ death.
Metaphorically speaking, RENAs naively extrapolating a trend based on one sample of (time-
series) data are like car drivers who feel perfectly safe driving at high speed at night on an unlit
road going straight because they cannot imagine a bend. Thus, they are only safe for as long
as no curve appears. They do not consider that an estimated trend, even if captured correctly
for a time, is only pointing in the right direction for as long as the trend does not break.
1.7 RENAs and First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
Even though the focus of this chapter has been so far on how neglecting random errors in-
fluences an individual’s predictions of future outcomes, the theory presented is applicable to
various other contexts due to its general setting. Whenever an economic agent has to make a
decision based on an uncertain future and relies on a random sample instead of complete in-
formation of the random process, this theoretical approach may offer a possible explanation
for discrepancies in empirically observed behavior and the theory of rational agents. In the
following, this is illustrated by using the context of bidding behavior in auctions.
As is shown below, neglect of the random error in combination with limited data as choice-
foundation offers some interesting insights about why auction participants might differ in
their behavior from the theoretical predictions of the classical theory for single-object private-
value auctions. The results presented below do not hinge on risk preferences or emotions as
the most common explanatory factors used in the literature and for which existing evidence
is rather mixed.
I focus on First-Price Sealed-Bid (FPSB) auctions in this section, i.e. auctions, in which all bids
are handed in simultaneously and privately, the highest bidder wins the object and has to pay
her bid. The underlying framework used in this section is the canonical model as, for example,
described in Chapter 2 of Krishna (2009): M bidders with quasi-linear preferences18 compete
18 I.e., bidders are risk-neutral.
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in an auction for an object they have an individual valuation for. Let vi denote the valuation
of bidder i ∈ {1, ...M }. This valuation is private information of each bidder. The agents have
no budget constraints and want to maximize their expected utility with their bidding behavior.
The model is symmetric in a sense that all values are independently and identically distributed
according to some increasing distribution function F on some interval [a,b], with b > a ≥ 0.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the valuations are uniformly distributed with a = 0 and b = 1.
It can be shown that the symmetric utility maximizing bidding strategy played in equilibrium
in an auction with only rational agents is bidding the expected value of the second highest val-
uation, given the agent’s value is the highest. Mathematically, b∗i = E [X (N )1 |X (N )1 < vi ], with
b∗i being agent i ’s optimal bid, vi her valuation and X
(N )
1 the highest order statistic out of N
(= M −1) other values, which is a random variable following a specific distribution dependent
on F . Note that this implies that no agent has an ex-ante incentive to deviate from this strategy
as long as he believes all others to behave this way.
How would the RENA behave in such a situation? As in earlier sections, I do not assume that
the RENA just follows a false model by assuming that he lacks important information about
the underlying structure. In this case, this means that he has no misguided priors about, for
example, the numbers of bidders, his own valuation, potentially correlated valuations or the
format of the auction. Further, considering the case that he is competing with rational agents,
he again uses the best possible action available and no "flawed heuristic" in the sense that
he, for example, just always bids his own valuation. Rather, I assume that he knows the sym-
metric bidding equilibrium strategy played by rational players and why it is played.19 Thus,
even if an agent i is a RENA, he will decide to bid according to b∗i from above. In this sense,
he somewhat behaves like a naive reader of auction theory literature with no real understand-
ing of the strategic reasons determining the optimal bid. He just wants to behave "optimally"
given his prior that all others follow the same behavior. The following proposition states the
consequences for the bidding behavior of RENAs:





1. For a given valuation vi , a majority of RENAs will overbid in a FPSB auction, i.e. place a
higher bid than E [X (N )1 |X (N )1 < vi ]. In turn, a minority of RENAs will underbid.
2. The RENAs who underbid will do so by a significantly higher absolute amount than those
who overbid.
Proposition 6 states that the deviation from the fully rational behavior arises when a RENA
actually determines his bid: again in line with this model’s assumptions, he does not (or can-
not) know the true distribution of X (N )1 and as a result, he cannot calculate the exact value of
E [X (N )1 |X (N )1 < vi ], given his valuation vi . Instead, he relies on a finite sample of X (N )1 < vi and
then calculates the mean of this sample.20 In line with the potential sources of the sample pre-
sented in Section 1.3, he might either have a sample based on past experiences, is exogenously
provided with the data, or has the true distribution in his long-term memory but can only
consider finite data in this operative memory due to capacity constraints. Further, because
he neglects the fact of only considering finite random draws, he believes his calculation to be
equivalent to the true expectation of the order statistic X (N )1 given that it is smaller than his
own valuation vi . Hence, instead of using all information of the respective probability density
f (X (N )1 |X (N )1 < vi ), he again only considers a finite amount of discrete realizations {A1, ..., An}
and naively believes to know it all.
This is particular problematic in this case because in contrast to e.g. the normal distribution,
f (X (N )1 |X (N )1 < vi ) is not symmetric around its mean but negatively skewed. This implies that
the measures of central tendency of this probability function are not aligned but dispersed,
i.e. median and mode are higher than the expected value. It is of particular importance in
this case that the mode of the distribution is located on the right hand side of the expected
value, because it points to the location with the highest concentration of probability mass for
a particular density function. In other words, the mode marks the location of a – in case of a
unimodal distribution global – maximum.
20 To some extent, a theory recently presented in Kasberger (2020) makes a similar assumption. However, in
contrast to my approach, it assumes rational bidders and focuses on different bidding strategies.
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Figure 1.7.1: Probability density functions of X (N )1 for three different N , given vi = 0.5.
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Figure 1.7.1 exemplifies that for X ∼ U [0,1] and a given valuation,21 f (X (N )1 |X (N )1 < vi ) has
this property for varying numbers of N : the red line, depicting the distributions mode, always
lies on the right hand side of the dotted black line, depicting the expected value.
This statistical property is the foundation for the first point in Proposition 6: it states that ran-
dom samples drawn from this distribution are more likely to contain realizations close to the
mode. In terms of the graphic above, RENAs are more likely to randomly draw second-highest
valuations close to their own, strictly higher than the correct expected value. Further, this im-
plies that a majority of this type of agent will calculate a sample average that lies above the
expected Value of f
(
X (N )1 |X (N )1 < vi
)
. In turn, a minority will calculate a sample mean lower
than the correct value. For simplicity and illustration, consider the corner case in which there
is an infinite mass of RENAs with the same valuation who separately compete in an auction
with N other bidders and who all consider individual random samples with only one data
point, respectively. For example, for N = 20, the Law of Large Numbers states that around 62%
of RENAs will draw a value higher than E [X (20)1 |X (20)1 < vi ]. Because they think their estima-
tion of the true average to be fully correct, they follow the "optimal strategy" and place a bid
as high as this particular value. Thus, they will overbid. In turn, the theory also states that a
minority of RENAs (around 38% in this case) will underbid.22
The second part of Proposition 6 is directly related to the first point: Because overbidding is
stated to be more prominent than underbidding, those who underbid must do so by a sig-
nificantly higher absolute amount. The result arises because overall, the sample mean is an
unbiased estimator of E [X (N )1 |X (N )1 < vi ], which means that when all single data points of all
RENAs are aggregated to one big sample, this overall sample’s mean would be equivalent to
the true aggregate. This, however, is statistically only possible if the data points of the above-
mentioned minority represent more severe deviations from the true average than those of the
majority. Thus, this theory states that one should observe more significant divergences from
the symmetrically optimal bid b∗ by participants who underbid.
To the best of my knowledge, no "meta-study" exists so far explicitly calculating the shares of
over- and underbidders in all auctions using the same framework and comparing the respec-
tive amounts by which they deviate from the Risk-Neutral Nash-Equilibrium bidding strat-
21 Stating it explicitly, the respective probability density is in this case equal to 1
v N
N xN−1.
22 The qualitative results do not change for N = 4, N = 9, or any other finite number N .
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egy. Although an empirical test might prove difficult due to the randomness, there exists
some evidence weakly in line with the results presented above. Overbidding appears to be
a prominent feature in FPSB auctions (Cox et al., 1988) and existing literature used explana-
tions like risk-averse bidders (Harrison, 1989) or emotions (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007; An-
dreoni et al., 2007) as a potential explanation for this phenomenon. However, in particular the
risk-aversion approach fails to explain (substantial) underbidding in such auction formats for
which also exists some evidence (Kirchkamp and Reiss, 2004; Ivanova-Stenzel and Sonsino,
2004).
1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I derive a new theory about individuals neglecting random errors to analyze
how they form beliefs about uncertain realizations of random events and how their resulting
conclusions are flawed. The theory presented in this chapter represents a synthesis of sta-
tistical theory and decision making by emphasizing how awareness of statistical properties is
essential for sophisticated probabilistic assessments and the resulting rational behavior.
Even though the estimation strategies in and of themselves are unbiased and hence, at least on
average accurate, RENAs still tend to make systematic mistakes when forming beliefs about
future outcomes. The problem can be considered to be some kind of misguided extrapola-
tion: when predicting the range for a future outcome by forming confidence bands, those
individuals underestimate the variation in potential realizations because they are too confi-
dent in their initial guesses made via the information from their samples. As a result, their
interval-boundaries are defined too narrowly. In other words, they consider the future to be
predictable to an extent that is rationally not justifiable. I further have shown how this mode
of thought can be transferred to already existing economic models. Moreover, due to its broad
specifications, the existing model can easily be modified by also including other biases. An
example would be an availability bias which lets the RENA put different weights on different
realizations in his sample such that some are just more salient. The resulting behavioral im-
plications should strongly resemble those from the literature about selective and limited recall
of information (Bordalo et al., 2016, 2017).
An interesting implication of this theory lies in a potential cure for the observed "misbehav-
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ior". In contrast to agents who are biased in form of a distorted perception of information
such that some data points with certain properties are just ignored, this theory states that the
mistakes an individual makes will decrease with the size of the sample he considers. Hence,
simply increasing the amount of data an agent uses for his assessment would lead to signif-
icant improvements. Given, for example, an employer fears that his employees are suffering
from this neglect, a potential remedy might be to require them to think of a certain number of
potential results their actions may cause to improve the overall outcome.
Even though I have shown that the theoretical predictions are in line with a variety of estab-
lished empirical findings, those present no conclusive evidence for the existence of random
error neglect. Thus, a desirable next step would be the design and conduct of an experiment
to either strengthen or debunk the central elements of this theory. Another potential area of
future research concerning theoretical extensions is to evaluate how RENAs might learn from
new data. The theory presented here is purely static and frequentistic without considering,
for example, if and how individuals might reconsider their initial estimates after they learned
that they actually made a mistake. If they incorporate the new realization in their sample,
the following guesses should become more and more sophisticated. However, that is just one
possible learning rule amongst many that may be considered.
The question on how humans form (and revise) beliefs about the future is and probably will
remain fascinating. The goal of this work is to contribute to a better understanding of how de-
viations from fully rational behavior might be explained. My hope is that future experimental




Autonomy Support and Innovation*
“We don’t need bosses. We need servant leaders.
We need people to serve their teams and let their teams
come up with the best ideas.”
V. Narasimhan, CEO Novartis
in an interview with Gharib (2019)
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate optimal investment dynamics in leadership behav-
ior that fosters innovation. Our focus is the intensity in which an innovation encouraging
leadership behavior must be displayed over time and not one specific management practice.
Management practices matter for an organization’s success (Bloom et al., 2013; Bloom and
Van Reenen, 2010), and economics has generally focused on beneficial complementarities be-
tween different practices (Ichniowski et al., 1995), Ichniowski and Shaw (1999). Rather little re-
search in organizational economics (with only a few exceptions like Hermalin (1998)) focuses
on the individual and how she ensures successful implementation of the practices: the leader
and her behavior. Non-monetary incentives that enrich the traditional economics’ toolkit
of bonus schemes, e.g. providing workers with meaning to their job and raising awareness
that their impact matters has been shown to increase worker motivation (Cassar and Meier,
* This chapter is based on joint work with Annemarie Gronau (LMU) and was first published in Gronau (2020).
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2018; Levitt and Neckermann, 2014), are conveyed through the leader and her behavior to-
wards the workforce. Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) find that in less traditional and productivity-
enhancing practices, line workers interact more with supervisors and co-workers. As the effec-
tiveness of management practices depends on their perceived quality and not their quantity
(Edgar and Geare, 2005), attributes of leadership behavior that embody them are of particular
interest.
Innovation is one important contributor to an organization’s long-term competitiveness and
success. Monetary incentives work for constrained problems but seem ineffective for open,
unconstrained innovation characterized e.g. by a lack of ex-ante specified goals (Charness
and Grieco, 2018). In general, management practices stimulate innovative activity (Shipton
et al., 2006), but we are unaware of work on non-monetary incentives specifically aiming at
encouraging innovative activities of the workforce. We argue that leadership behavior can be
such a non-monetary incentive that instills innovative activity.
Workers in a hierarchical work relationship, who are not specifically employed to innovate,
refrain from sharing novel ideas if they fear questioning the status quo and resulting negative
consequences for themselves. They will speak up if they believe their ideas, and potentially
critique, is welcomed and taken seriously by management. The leadership behavior of their
supervisor can create a safe space where workers feel free to come up and share novel ideas.
This kind of leadership behavior is captured by the concept of Autonomy Support. Self-Deter-
mination Theory is an established construct in Social Psychology, and Autonomy herein is
defined as a feeling of volition and freedom that a person experiences e.g. at work (Gagné and
Deci, 2005). Autonomy Support is the degree to which the social context enables this feeling,
which in our model is the leadership behavior of the principal. Autonomy Support strikes
a balance between providing structure and granting freedom of thought, as it creates a safe
space for experimentation and failure (Pisano, 2019) which inspires innovation, unleashes
creative thinking and encourages workers to communicate their novel ideas.
Kaizen is an example for an Autonomy Supportive leadership behavior, and has received much
attention in operations management of the manufacturing sector for some time (see Singh
and Singh (2009) for a review). In the Kaizen philosophy, supervisors train workers in meth-
ods and Kaizen tools, invite ideas and offer feedback in a non-judgemental way, aiming at de-
veloping their workers to share their contributions for improvement and innovation in a safe
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environment (Quality-One International, 2015). Toyota adopted this innovation encouraging
management style with a view to continuous improvement and lean management, which re-
sulted in a strong comparative advantage over a competitor relying on controlling incentives
(Helper and Henderson, 2014). Operations management and people management go hand in
hand for a company’s success (Bloom et al., 2015). We focus on the intensity in which Auton-
omy Support must be provided, whether it be in operations or people management practices,
that encourages heterogeneous workers to thrive in innovative activities without a monetary
component.
We formalize Autonomy Support in a principal-agent model as an investment in leadership
behavior over time, as single interventions fade out eventually. We derive optimal investment
patterns in Autonomy Support that incentivize effort in creative, small scale innovation of the
workforce at the bottom of the hierarchy. The patterns are co-determined by the initial Auton-
omy Support levels of the agent and the rate at which support fades, as well as the benefit-cost
ratio and time discount factor of the principal. We find that the principal invests in Auton-
omy Supportive leadership behavior for almost all parameter constellations. Only if the agent
comes with extremely low or high initial levels of Autonomy Support does she refrain from
investment. We demonstrate that the principal engages in Autonomy Supportive leadership
behavior in accordance with the agent’s need to be lifted up as to become active in innova-
tion. Thereby, we contribute to the literature of managing innovation and the literature on
economic incentives with a view to the current debate on work and whether monetary re-
wards are sufficient for performance (Shiller, 2019).
We proceed as follows. First, we show the limited effectiveness of monetary incentives to fos-
ter small scale innovation. We then introduce the concept of Autonomy Support review the
literature on how it incentivizes innovative activity of the workforce. We then derive the the-
oretical model to trace optimal investments in Autonomy Support over time. We analyze the
resulting investment patterns and derive policy recommendation and future avenues for re-
search. Lastly, we conclude this chapter.
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2.2 Limited effectiveness of monetary incentives for small scale innovation
Small scale innovation describes small step improvements of products and processes. It is
also typically associated to originate from the part of the workforce who are not specifically
employed to innovate, but employees who find creative ways to improve a product or process
they are involved in. Small scale innovation can have an important impact on profits. For
example, a Walmart worker’s idea to use lighter one-step stools for loading trucks will save
$ 30 millions in costs from inefficient packing (Thomas, 2019). Customer needs to adapt a
product are identified through personal interaction of customer service executives (Bilsland
and Cumbers, 2018). While small scale innovation may be of particular interest to small and
medium sized companies that cannot maintain an R&D department (Rammer et al., 2009), it
is interesting for companies of all sizes to encourage small scale innovation.
An important question then is whether small scale innovation can be incentivized financially.
The seminal paper of Manso (2011) displays how an incentive scheme designed to tolerate
early failure and reward late successes does indeed encourage innovation, a result that is
backed up by a lab experiment in Ederer and Manso (2013). It is important to note that the
authors speak of innovation in terms of the contrast between exploitation and exploration.
Whether an agent is incentivized to exploit a given business situation or to explore a set of
business opportunities: neither qualifies as a creative, unconstrained situation. The recent
experimental literature suggests that monetary incentives increase the effort exerted and the
quantity and quality of ideas, but do not have an impact on creativity or originality. In fact,
they may even reduce creativity (Erat and Gneezy, 2016; Laske and Schröder, 2017). Gibbs
et al. (2017) find that with monetary rewards fewer individuals submit more ideas, suggesting
a trade-off where people refrain from sharing small and possibly far fetched ideas. The dif-
ferential impact of monetary incentives on the number of ideas generated and their degree
of creativity highlights that the innovation term is used broadly from new combinations of
known elements to creative, out-of-the-box approaches. Charness and Grieco (2018) distin-
guish between constrained and open creativity, and conclude that financial incentives only
work for constrained tasks. We adopt this distinction for the remainder of this chapter.
Further, we know that incentive schemes must be carefully designed as to avoid unintended
consequences. One major factor is the measurability of effort or output on which the mon-
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etary incentive is conditioned. But small scale innovation that improves products and pro-
cesses is hard to measure, in contrast to the launch of new products and techniques. For
example, small process improvements are likely to be tested at some departments and then
phased in for the entire organization, making it difficult to disentangle department effects.
Continuously changing the production process with small improvements is likely to be dis-
ruptive, such that a product is relaunched with a set of small improvements as, for instance,
Ikea’s ‘new’ Billy bookshelf. This renders it impossible to trace better performance to one im-
provement alone. Toyota’s productivity increase from Kaizen in the 1980s is attributed to its
general ability to foster small scale innovation (Helper and Henderson, 2014), but not to one
single improvement.
The operability of financial incentives for small scale innovation is therefore limited in ad-
dition to their inability to encourage open and creative ideas. This problem is amplified for
the workforce on the ground whose core job is not to contribute ideas. These workers are the
ones experiencing the production process first hand, have insight knowledge about the prod-
uct and work in customer service, which makes them acutely aware of potential problems.
But a variety of reasons can restrain them to voice a novel idea: they may fear repercussion
for challenging the status quo (Zhou and George, 2003), worry that an idea that does not work
out signals inability for the job, or are afraid that a successful idea can render their job useless.
In order to unleash the small scale innovation potential of their workforce, companies must
acknowledge and address these concerns, a task monetary incentives are unfit for.
2.3 How Autonomy Support incentivizes innovation
Leadership behavior is key for fostering small scale, open innovation of the workforce. Differ-
ent management practices coalesce in providing a safe space for workers to raise their ideas
and concerns, as well as welcoming and encouraging their ideas are characterized by this lead-
ership behavior. This holds particularly true for workers who are not specifically employed for
creative, innovative tasks, such as shop floor workers and customer advisers. These typically
work within an organizational structure of controlling guidelines, work processes, and dead-
lines that does not give space for ideation. The pressure they experience prevents creative
thinking, and “Numerous attempts at creativity get killed in their infancy because employ-
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ees fall victim to these emotions” [caused by pressure] (Zhou and George, 2003). The authors
make the case that a key determinant for creativity in the workplace is leadership and a super-
vision style that manages the workers’ emotions through empowerment and encouragement.
However, providing complete leeway, or no structure at all is unlikely to excite a worker to
engage in some innovative activity that actually results in improvements for the company.
Pisano (2019) rectifies this misunderstanding of an innovative organizational culture to be
just encouraging by emphasizing the balance that management must strike to truly innova-
tive improvements: there must be tolerance for failure, but not for incompetence; there must
be a willingness to experiment, but in a highly disciplined way; there must be collaboration,
but with individual accountability; there must be flat, but strong leadership: an innovative
organizational culture, he writes, must be “psychologically safe but brutally candid”.
The leadership behavior in an innovative organizational culture that achieves this balance is
one of Autonomy Support. We introduce the concept of Autonomy Support and provide a
literature review underlining its impact on innovation.
2.3.1 Autonomy Support
Autonomy Support is a concept from Self-Determination Theory. The underlying concept of
Autonomy refers to a feeling of volition and freedom (Gagné and Deci, 2005) when engaging in
an activity. Autonomy is thus overlapping but distinct from both its colloquial meaning of in-
dependence or the economic concept of intrinsic motivation. The latter two describe a person
who chooses independent of others, or chooses what he wants. Autonomy however means
that a person experiences a feeling of freedom while doing something even if the person may
not have chosen it for himself. This is particularly important for the work environment as a
worker has essentially never complete, independent choice of what to do. But he can expe-
rience a feeling of Autonomy because he is not controlled at work, or finds value in his work
and work environment. It seems perspicuous that a feeling of volition and freedom positively
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underpins creative thinking, and most people who ever tried to think out-of-the-box under
pressure and control (the opposite of Autonomy in Self-Determination Theory) would agree.2
Autonomy Support then is “the degree to which socializing agents take the tar-
get individual’s perspective; act in ways that encourage choice and self-initiation;
provide meaningful rationales and relevance; and refrain from using language or
displaying behaviours that are likely to be experienced as pressure toward partic-
ular behaviours” (Benita et al., 2014).
Autonomy Support goes beyond one or multiple specific management practices. The overall
leadership behavior of the supervisor that permeates management practices however can be
Autonomy Supportive. Reflecting the definition of Autonomy Support, Stone et al. (2009) ex-
patiate the following points outlining how practitioners can create autonomous motivation in
the long run:
- Asking open questions including inviting participation in solving important problems
- Active listening including acknowledging the employees’ perspective
- Offering choices within structure, including the clarification of responsibilities
- Providing sincere, positive feedback that acknowledges initiative, and factual,
non-judgmental feedback about problems
- Minimizing coercive controls such as rewards and comparisons with others
- Develop talent and share knowledge to enhance competence and autonomy
Indeed, this constitutes the balance of a successful the management style as described in
Pisano (2019). We now turn to the empirical evidence of how such an Autonomy Support-
ive management style facilitates innovative activity of the workforce in real life.
2 Assume the example of a Ph.D. student. He may research on whatever he chooses (independence), but that
does not necessarily mean that he is motivated, or successful. What does help him succeed is Autonomy
Support. Autonomy Support may come in the form of a supervisor who (a) enables and encourages him
to take initiative and choose, (b) offers advice, (c) shares his/her perspective and experience when solving
problems, and/or (d) offers the "bigger picture".
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2.3.2 Literature review: Autonomy Support and innovation
Our introductory example of Toyota’s Autonomy Supportive management style Kaizen ticks
all boxes of Stone et al. (2009)’s list above. Workers are trained in statistical methods and the
structure of the Kaizen process and Kaizen events such that they can make full use of it (Helper
and Henderson, 2014; Quality-One International, 2015). They also receive feedback and en-
couragement both from their supervisor and colleagues (Helper and Henderson, 2014). Be-
sides the continuously displayed leadership behavior, Toyota organized regular Kaizen events
structured to invite and harness ideas and provide room to improve them. These events can
be designed for broader knowledge gathering or brainstorming in a specific field, but in all
cases, it is the task of the management to provide structure and create a safe environment
(Early, 2012). Helper and Henderson (2014) attribute Toyota’s increased productivity at a time
when its rival’s GM productivity decreased to the small scale innovation incentivized by this
leadership behavior.
Autonomy Support is however not a direct result from an adopted management style alone,
but conditional on the behavior of the individual leader, such that differences within a com-
pany can arise. Amabile et al. (2004)’s study on the impact of perceived leadership support on
creativity showcases a vivid example for Autonomy Support, scrutinizing the widely diverging
impact of two ‘extreme’ micro-managing team leaders in a firm. Both individuals are micro-
managing in the sense that they are closely monitoring their team. One uses this management
practice only to communicate top level decisions down to them, which puts pressure on the
team. The other uses monitoring for immediate exchanges on upcoming challenges, con-
sults the team in decisions and ensures smooth cooperation between team and top manage-
ment. There is no independence in choice in either team, but in the latter the micro-manager
displays Autonomy Support in his leadership behavior. As a consequence, the authors find
that this team engages successfully in innovative activities. The controllingly monitored team
however is unsuccessful. They further record a positive and a negative spiral in each team
respectively. Autonomy Supportive leadership behavior manifests itself over time and has a
lasting effect. The leader invests over time in the relationship with its team to constitute a
coherent behavior. Besides the time component, this example pinpoints that Autonomy Sup-
port encompasses both “instrumental and socioemotional support” (Amabile et al., 2004) and
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that Autonomy Support and a tight structure are not mutually exclusive. One might argue that
because of the structure, the leadership behavior of the Autonomy Supportive team leader
was particularly important. This case also demonstrates that leadership behavior is not con-
ditional on one specific management practice.
A leader achieves a structure that creates a safe space such that a feeling of Autonomy and
innovative activity can arise by, for example, specifying only “issues to avoid” (Van de Ven,
1986), fostering a feeling of ownership (Dorenbosch et al., 2005) that leads to identification
with a leader such that workers follow (Yoshida et al., 2014). Psychological safety promotes
creativity, as shown e.g. in part time graduate students (Kark and Carmeli, 2009), and con-
tributes to a firm’s financial success through innovation, e.g. in a study of 163 Turkish firms
(Akgün et al., 2009). Mumford et al. (2002) conclude that if a leader balances structure and en-
couragement (being both “cheerleader” as well as “the most demanding critic”), workers “can
express their creative capacity”. Interestingly, Zhou and George (2001) find that an Autonomy
Supportive work environment encourages even dissatisfied workers to be creative. It allows
them to use channels to change something about their current situation. At the team level, a
leader provides and develops “a safe psychosocial climate and appropriate group processes”
(West, 2002) on both the individual and the team level through consultative participation,
clarifying objectives and encouraging positive feedback. The team members can then rein-
force Autonomy Support among one another (Gagné and Deci, 2005). The team leader’s role
is “orchestrating” these efforts (Mumford et al., 2002), and like a conductor, becoming part
of the group and ensuring that the members work harmoniously together. In the health care
sector, for example, this has been shown to increase quality of work and innovation (Borrill
et al., 2000).
An Autonomy Supportive leadership is beneficial also for workers who have a personal ten-
dency for creativity. Indeed, it falls short to assume that personal creativity alone achieves in-
novative activity (Mumford et al., 2002). Rather, personal creativity and an appropriate work
context complement each other in accomplishing this goal (Janssen et al., 2004). In the ab-
sence of non-controlling and supportive supervision creativity and patents actually decrease
(Oldham and Cummings, 1996). Creativity of workers unsure of their capabilities is unleashed
when management builds their confidence and serves as a role model (Tierney and Farmer,
2002), pointing towards the importance of Autonomy Support for blue collar workers. More
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complex jobs are assumed to spur worker’s interest and creativity. Even for those Shalley et al.
(2009) show that Autonomy Support has a positive impact on creativity regardless of whether
workers have a high or low degree of Autonomy or work in complex or less complex jobs. For
low Autonomy and less complex jobs the effect is just more pronounced.
As with other incentives, Autonomy Support must be properly designed and applied to ensure
the desired effect and prevent unintended consequences. It is insufficient to give workers pro
forma choice as to create an illusion of Autonomy. Experiments indicate that when workers’
decisions are not taken seriously it discourages effort: when workers are delegated to choose
which project to implement, but the leader overrules their decision, effort levels and transfers
(Sloof and von Siemens, 2019; Corgnet and Hernán González, 2013) plummet. A successful
manager must be able to change one’s mind when involving workers in the decision process
(Corgnet and Hernán González, 2013). Leadership behavior that is perceived as insincere or
intrusive has a negative impact on innovative behavior (Bammens, 2016). Autonomy Support
must also specifically aim at encouraging innovation. Ohly et al. (2006) find that while Auton-
omy Support inspires personal initiative, it does not increase creativity and innovation, and
ascribe this finding to the fact that supervisor support was not clearly targeted at innovation.
The company’s system of processing suggestions might have been misused to communicate
complaints.
This review highlights that Autonomy Support encompasses a variety of actions and behav-
iors of a leader, which can be displayed in a different operations and human management
practices. Autonomy Supportive leadership behavior must be authentic and offer both in-
strumental and emotional support. A one time Autonomy Supportive intervention is unlikely
to have a believable lasting effect, and fades over time. Therefore, it must be reinforced and
renewed. Regular efforts to provide Autonomy Support are necessary, and different behaviors
or intensities may be required at different points in time. While companies like Toyota incor-
porate a management style that targets at Autonomy Support, it eventually comes down to the
quality of the leadership behavior of the principal in question. We formalize these notions in
our model.
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2.4 A model of investments in Autonomy Support
2.4.1 Model setup
We investigate optimal investments in providing Autonomy Support of a principal with a view
to incentivize innovative activity of the worker. We expect optimal investments to vary over
time, as leadership behavior and actions required differ. For example, extensive methods
training or occasional feedback require behavior of different time intensity. We choose a two-
period model to incorporate this notion in a principal-agent model. It allows us to keep the
model as tractable as possible whilst capturing the dynamic aspect of Autonomy Support in-
vestments.
For the purpose of the research question, we concentrate only on innovative activity i of the
agent as inventivized through Autonomy Support by the principal. When the agent (he) en-
gages in innovative activity i the probability for his efforts to result in a successful innovation
increases according to the probability function
Pr (i ) = i
1+ i
with Pr (i ) ∈ [0,1) for i ≥ 0.
The agent experiences effort costs from innovative activity, which decreases in the amount of
Autonomy Support available to the agent. Prior discounted and current Autonomy Support
constitute this available amount. The discount factor δ accounts for the fact that Autonomy
Support investments fade out over time. A one period intervention does not carry indefinitely
into future periods with the same motivational power. We factor in the Autonomy Support
provided previously, either in employment or personal relationships, by assuming a personal
consolidated start level s̄ of an agent. Alternatively, the start value can be interpreted as the
agent’s personal autonomous motivation level for innovation prior to employment (Shalley
et al., 2009). Different agents therefore have different initial levels of s̄. The total value of
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Autonomy support s̄1 and s̄2 available to an agent in periods t = 1,2 is therefore given by
s̄1 = δs̄ + sa,1
s̄2 = δ2 s̄ +δsa,1 + sa,2
denoting the sum of the discounted start value s̄ and the principal’s investments in the prior,
discounted, and the current period.
The payoff the agent experiences from successful innovation is denoted as v A and normalized
to one. We understand this payoff to be the utility derived from being creatively active and
seeing one’s innovative activity come to fruition, not as a monetary reward. Taken together,
the agent’s utility as a function of his innovative activity i for periods t = 1,2 are









UA(i ,2) = v A i
1+ i −
i
δ2 s̄ +δsa,1 + sa,2





The principal (she) receives a payoff vP when the agent’s innovation is successful, and bears
costs c(sa,t ) = αsa,t from providing Autonomy Support at time t . α denotes the principal’s
marginal cost. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as her ability to provide Autonomy Support.
The principal is forward looking and accounts for the fact that Autonomy Support provided in
period 1 impacts innovative activity and thus innovation profit in both periods. The principal
discounts her profit in period 2 with β and includes it in her first period considerations. The
profit functions for periods t = 1,2 are
ΠP (sa,1,1) = vP i
1+ i −αsa,1 +βΠP (sa,2,2) (2.3)
ΠP (sa,2,2) = vP i
1+ i −αsa,2 (2.4)
We assume that the principal can perfectly observe the initial amount of Autonomy Support s̄
the agent enters the work relationship with. We look at situations in which the benefits from
Autonomy Support and its associated costs are such that the principal considers investment.
We achieve this by assuming that the benefit-cost ratio satisfies vP
α
> 2. The time line of the
model is as follows. In each period, the agent’s total Autonomy Support is depreciated before
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the principal has the opportunity to invest anew. Based on the currently available Autonomy












The principal seeks to maximize her profits from innovation by optimally investing in the
agent’s Autonomy Support. We solve the maximization problem via Backward Induction be-
cause profits are time-interdependent through the investment choices.
2.4.2 Solving the model
Solving for period t = 2
While the principal takes future effects of her own current investment into account, the agent
is backward looking. He considers each period separately and only takes past investments
in his available Autonomy Support into account. In period t = 2, he maximizes UA(i ,2) from
Equation (2.2) by his choice of innovative activity i , resulting in
i∗2 = (δ2 s̄ +δsa,1 + sa,2)
1
2 −1 (2.5)
The agent’s innovative effort i∗2 depends on his initial Autonomy Support level, the discounted
previous and the current Autonomy Support investment by the principal. The agent only be-
comes active if there is overall enough Autonomy Support. If previous Autonomy Support is
low or heavily discounted such that δ2 s̄ +δsa,1 = 0, no innovative activity takes place if the
principal does not sufficiently invest in the current period t = 2. If the previous Autonomy
Support is high and/or is only mildly discounted, innovative effort is exerted even if the prin-
cipal does not invest in the current period at all, with sa,2 = 0.
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The principal maximizes ΠP (sa,2,2) from Equation (2.4) in order to derive her optimal invest-





3 −δ2 s̄ −δsa,1 ≥ 0 (2.6)
s∗a,2 increases in profit vP from successful innovation and decreases in the marginal cost pa-
rameter α for providing Autonomy Support. The benefit-cost ratio vPα also comes into play
when determining if the principal invests at all in the second period. Only if the agent’s ini-
tial Autonomy Support level and previous investment is low or heavily discounted such that
it does not exceed the benefit-cost ratio vP
α
, does the principal choose a positive investment
sa,2 > 0. Otherwise, the principal does not need to replenish the stock of Autonomy Support
and chooses sa,2 = 0.
The principal’s profit in period t = 2 when she engages in current Autonomy Support invest-
ments s∗a,2 > 0 is
Π∗P,2(s
∗

















3 +α(δ2 s̄ +δsa,1)
and for her optimal choice of s∗a,2 = 0
Π∗P,2(s
∗
a,2|s∗a,2 = 0) = vP −
vP
(δ2 s̄ +δsa,1) 12
> 0
Solving for period t = 1
The agent maximizes his utility UA(i ,1) of period t = 1 in Equation (2.1) by choosing
i∗1 = (δs̄ + sa,1)
1
2 −1 ≥ 0
The agent’s innovation effort in period t = 1 increases in both his initial Autonomy Support
level and the principal’s investment in the current period.
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When maximizing ΠP (sa,1,1) in Equation (2.3), the principal takes this and the discounted
future impact of her investments in period t = 1 for the subsequent period into account. Her






3 −δs̄ ≥ 0 (2.7)
Her investment increases when the benefit-cost ratio increases and increases in how strongly
she values future periods, as described by β. The effect of the agent’s discount parameter δ is
ambiguous and will be part of the discussion on the different investment patterns. Contingent
on the parameter constellation, the principal may or may not invest in Autonomy Support in
period t = 1.
The resulting profit in period t = 1, if she invests in Autonomy Support in both periods such
that s∗a,1 > 0 and s∗a,2 > 0, is
Π∗P,1(s
∗



























and for s∗a,1 = 0
Π∗1 (s
∗












2.4.3 Results: Autonomy Support investment patterns
We derive the investment patterns that emerge depending on the parameter constellations of
the benefit-cost ratio vP
α
, the agent’s depreciation rate of Autonomy Support δ, and the prin-
cipal’s discount factor β of future profits.3
The first broad distinction for the different patterns is the relationship between the agent’s
and principal’s future benefits from investing in Autonomy Support in the current period. The
3 The specific derivations for each case are stated in the Mathematical Appendices B.1 and B.2.
51
AUTONOMY SUPPORT AND INNOVATION






as depicted in Figure 2.4.1, where 1
δ
−pδ=β is delineated.
Figure 2.4.1: β- δ relationship
To the left of this line, 1δ −
p
δ > β holds when either δ or β, or both simultaneously are low.
The agent discounts Autonomy Support at a high rate, and investments fade out strongly. The
principal does not value future payoffs highly. Intuitively, this translates to lower incentives to
invest in Autonomy Support and results in lower investments.
To the right of this line, 1δ −
p
δ< β holds when β and δ are simultaneously high. This means
that the agent discounts Autonomy Support at a low rate, and investments last. The principal
values future payoffs strongly. Investing in the current period is beneficial for both. Intuitively,
this translates to higher incentives to invest Autonomy Support and results in higher invest-
ments in the given period.
In accordance with this distinction, we now describe the specific investments for low and for
high future benefit investment patterns.
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Low future benefit investment patterns under 1
δ
−pδ>β
Pattern I: Investment in each period
The principal chooses a positive investment in period t = 1, s∗a,1 > 0, if the initial Autonomy









3 > s̄i (2.11)
This means that the benefit-cost ratio vPα of innovation is high enough to interest the principal
in encouraging innovative activity. However, the initial Autonomy Support amount is so low
that she chooses to invest in the first period. After the depreciation of s∗a,1 (in Equation (2.7))




























which is always true for 1
δ
−pδ>β as assumed for this section.
Rearranging the time-interdependent profit function of period t = 1 (Equation (2.8)) yields a


















≡ XΠP1,1 ≥ 0 (2.12)
The initial amount of Autonomy Support s̄i must exceed this threshold, otherwise the princi-
pal does not find it optimal to add to it in the first and subsequent second period. Intuitively,
there must be some, but not too much Autonomy Support of the agent to build on such that
the principal, although inclined to invest little, finds it optimal to invest in both periods. In Fig-
ure 2.4.2, we see that depending on the initial Autonomy Support, the principal matches her
investment such that the agent achieves the s̄1 necessary to optimally exert effort in innova-
tive activity. The higher the initial level, the less must the principal touch it up. The emerging
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patterns are steadily decreasing (Pattern Ia in Figure 2.4.2) or hump-shaped (Pattern Ib).
The agent’s utilities in the respective periods are
UA(i



















Pattern II: Investment only in second period
If the agent enters the company with an initial amount of Autonomy Support s̄i i that exceeds
the threshold in Equation (2.11), the principal does not invest in period t = 1 in the 1δ−
p
δ>β










3 > s̄i i (2.13)
or, phrased differently, if the initial Autonomy Support amount is sufficient to encourage in-
novative activity in the first period, but not in the second period.
The agent’s utilities become
UA(i

















Pattern III: No investment
If the agent’s initial amount of Autonomy Support s̄i i i exceeds the threshold in Equation (2.11),
such that
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it is sufficiently high to encourage innovative activity even if the principal does not invest in
either period. The agent’s utilities are
UA(i

















In contrast, if the initial level is so low that it falls short of the threshold XΠP1,1 in Equation
(2.12), then the principal optimally chooses not to invest in either period and no innovation





No investments for a high and a low initial amounts and the resulting development of Auton-
omy Support levels are depicted in Pattern IIIa and Pattern IIIb in Figure 2.4.2.
Pattern Thresholds Investment
IIIb s̄ < XΠP1,1 no









































3 ≤ s̄i i i no
Table 2.4.1: Thresholds for low future benefit investment patterns
Table 2.4.1 displays an overview of the thresholds for all low future investment patterns. For
given parameter values the principal prefers investing only in the second period when the
agent’s initial level of Autonomy Support is high enough.
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Figure 2.4.2: Development of Autonomy Support for low future benefit investment patterns
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High future benefit investment patterns under 1
δ
−pδ≤β
Pattern IV: Investment only in first period
With the relationship 1
δ




























and the principal always optimally chooses s∗a,2 = 0.










3 > s̄i v (2.15)
however, this equation takes a different value than in Pattern I.
Inserting s∗a,1, s
∗
a,2 in the time interdependent profit function of period t = 1, we can derive a
lower bound XΠP1,2 that ensures that the principal invests in t = 1:
















The resulting utilities for the agent are
UA(i































The principal matches his investment to the agent’s initial level in the first period such that
he exerts optimal innovative effort in both periods. With varying initial levels, the pattern for
development over time can take the shape of Pattern IVa or Pattern IVb, steadily decreasing or
hump-shaped, as depicted in Figure 2.4.3.
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Pattern V: No investment











then it sufficiently big to encourage innovative activity in both periods without investments
by the principal. In contrast, if the initial amount of Autonomy Support is so small that it falls
short of the threshold in Equation (2.15), the principal does not find it worthwhile to invest in
Autonomy Support at all. For high or low initial levels, the investments are depicted in Patterns
Va and Vb in Figure 2.4.3, respectively.
The resulting utilities are as in Pattern III, albeit with parameters satisfying 1
δ
−pδ≤β.
Table 2.4.2 displays an overview of the thresholds for high future benefit investment patterns.
For given parameter values the principal prefers investing only in the first period when the
agent’s initial level of Autonomy Support is high enough.
Pattern Thresholds Investment
Vb s̄ < XΠP1,2 no


















3 ≤ s̄v no
Table 2.4.2: Thresholds for high future benefit investment patterns
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Figure 2.4.3: Development of Autonomy Support for high future benefit investment patterns
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2.5 Discussion and implications
More attractive investments in Autonomy Support, let that be because of higher payoff vP or
lower cost α, naturally result in higher investments, and potentially investments in more time
periods, as can be seen in Tables 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.
For both β-δ relationships and a given benefit-cost ratio vP
α
, we find a certain substitutability4
between s̄ and the principal’s investments, following the literature that investments additively
impact a worker’s creative inclination (Hagger et al., 2015). The more the agent feels encour-
aged to be active in innovation at the start the work relationship, the less must the principal
invest in order to maintain that motivation. Substitutability does not infer, however, that for
individuals with high initial levels Autonomy Support investments are futile. Even for rather
high levels of initial Autonomy Support we find positive investments in at least one period by
the principal. This reflects the finding that it cannot be taken for granted that workers creative
at the beginning of a work relationship remain so (Mumford et al., 2002).
In those cases where the agent’s initial level and the level required to achieve the optimal in-
novation effort choice do not diverge too strongly, the principal matches their difference with
her investment as depicted in Figures 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. The difference is co-determined by the
rate at which the initial level and further investments are depreciated as well as the valuation
of the principal for future periods. Our model hence captures the notion that individuals have
different Autonomy Support requirements to succeed at different points in time, and that ap-
propriate intensity of Autonomy Support investments position them to be successful (Shalley
et al., 2009).
For those situations where the principal only invests in one of the two periods, the β-δ rela-
tionship determines in which period the investment is done. When the principal’s valuation
of the next period exceeds the depreciation term ( 1
δ
−pδ≤ β), she invests ‘in advance’ in the
first period such that the Autonomy Support given carries over to the second period and still
encourages innovative activity. This reflects a result in the innovation management litera-
ture that Autonomy Support in the form of encouragement is particularly important at early
stages of an innovative project, while Autonomy Support in the form of partaking in the deci-
4 The model with complementarity between the initial level and investments is derived in the Mathematical
Appendix B.3. We show that complementarity only eliminates the u-shaped Pattern II and no investment
Pattern V for high initial levels of Autonomy Support. Else, our qualitative results remain unchanged.
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sion process and control over the implementation becomes more important in later periods
(Axtell et al., 2006). It seems plausible to assume that the latter is less time-intensive for the
principal and can be described by her lower investments in Autonomy Support at the later
period. This is also in accordance with a situation where the principal has a high valuation of
future periods: if she manages the entire project from the first creative idea up to the imple-
mentation, she likely is forward looking and rather invests in advance instead of supporting
her worker only at later stages of the project.
We observe the possibility of a u-shape of Autonomy Support investments in Pattern IIb when
either or both of β and δ are low ( 1
δ
−pδ ≥ β). Although relying on the agent’s initial level in
the first period, the principal touches up the depreciated Autonomy Support in the second
period. This result is surprising: intuitively, one expects that the principal refrains from in-
vestments in the last period of the work relationship. The expected profit from innovation in
the second period is enough for her to make that investment nonetheless. Considering the
notion that the principal only provides Autonomy Support as required to achieve innovative
activity, the principal can optimally decide to let initial levels deteriorate and invest only in
the last period. As this result is possible even when the principal has all information and acts
rationally, it stands to reason that this case gains importance when the principal is not fully
informed. For example, a principal in a company that has not done Autonomy Support before
may not be fully aware of the potential benefits vP from innovative activity or the actual costs
α of providing support, or how quickly Autonomy Support discounts at rate δ. In the course of
managing her workforce, she learns about these dimensions and adjusts her optimal invest-
ment decision accordingly.
We find that the principal optimally chooses not to invest if the agent’s initial Autonomy Sup-
port level exceeds a high threshold (Equations 2.14, 2.17), that allows innovative activity with-
out any investments. These thresholds are key: the principal does not choose to invest be-
cause she does not see worth in Autonomy Support, but for a given benefit-cost ratio vPα that
co-determines the thresholds it is not optimal for her to do so. This adds nuance to the notion
that some companies rely on agent’s creativity because they do not want to invest (Mumford
et al., 2002). Instead, they may not find it optimal, and workers still exert innovation effort. On
the reverse, the benefit-cost ratio may not allow the principal to invest and build up Auton-
omy Support in agents that arrive with a very low initial level.
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The intuition of the investment dynamics of our two-period model can easily be transferred
to a multiple period model. Investments then carry over to more than one subsequent period
and positively influence the principal’s profit potentially longer. As in our two-period model,
the principal only aims for a lower level of innovative activity i in the last period. With more
periods, her investments in earlier periods are higher and fade out towards the end of the re-
lationship. The distinction in our results with respect to the β-δ relationship becomes less
important. In either case, we expect a wave pattern of investments. In the low investment
case, the principal restocks the Autonomy Support depreciated from the previous period, and
in the high investment case, the principal invests in advance and lets it depreciate in the next
period. But this only matters for the initial investments. Afterwards, the principal ensures the
optimal long term innovative effort by maintaining it with her investments. This means that
at some point, the principal replenishes the depreciated Autonomy Support even of an agent
with a very high initial level. In the intermediate periods of the model, we expect rather sta-
ble expected profits and utilities from innovative activity. The picture is less clear for agents
who enter the company with such a low level of Autonomy Support that in our version, the
principal refrains from investment. With more periods, the threshold for not investing would
be lower, as the principal would forego more profits over time. This renders it potentially
interesting to build such a worker’s Autonomy Support "from scratch". Considering real life
employment relationships and life cycles, this seems plausible. Only under the conceivably
worst starting condition do investments in Autonomy Support not positively impact a per-
son’s activity and unleash creative potential. The notion that growth is inherently possible,
and desirable, for everyone is perfectly in line with Self-Determination Theory.
Thus far, the depreciation rate is assumed to be agent-specific. However, we can also under-
stand δ to be an environmental variable. Supervisors’ choice of providing Autonomy Support
has a strong impact on workers’ innovative efforts that can diverge even within a company
(Amabile et al., 2004), and Autonomy Support is relationship-specific between supervisor and
worker. If the company has an organizational structure prone to disrupting this relationship,
e.g. a tendency for unexpected job rotation or restructuring, at least part of the Autonomy
Support is lost because it is not necessarily attributed the company, but the specific supervi-
sor. The company then influences innovative activity not only through investments via the
supervisor, but also whether it allows these investments to last. This suggests that δ as an
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environmental variable is correlated with investments in Autonomy Support: the more eas-
ily the organizational structure disrupts supervisor-worker relationships, the more important
become supervisors’ investments. This interpretation can be incorporated in the model by
allowing investments in Autonomy support to also influence a period-specific depreciation
rate.
Our model further indicates that agents with varying start values of Autonomy Support derive
similar utilities from being innovatively active. Only those with start values so high that they
prevent further investments thrive above, while those with start values so low that no invest-
ments are made have no utility. This underlines our understanding that people value being
allowed to be creative, but also adds to the bigger notion that they value being autonomous:
not only appreciating results, but also the processes that lead to results (Benz and Frey, 2008).
Transferring our findings to real world scenarios indicates that for longer relationships, re-
flected in a multiple period scenario, Autonomy Support is more likely provided continuously.
The first investment, as in the first period of our model, depends on the β-δ relationship.
When they are high, such that both parties expect high future benefits, the supervisor en-
gages in sizable Autonomy Support investments right from the start. When one or both are
low, the principal anticipates low future benefits, such that the first investment is rather small.
As such, high Autonomy Support investments can be understood as part of an on-boarding
process where both parties expect the work relationship to last. We believe that screening for
Autonomy Support in the recruitment process occurs even in the absence of specific mea-
surements. Previous Autonomy Support is reflected in previous behaviors and choices of the
agent, which may at least be in part observable, e.g. in the CV or recommendation letters. In
an ongoing work relationship, the current need for Autonomy Support investments may be
detected by employing questionnaires for perceived Autonomy Support (Hagger et al., 2007;
Mageau et al., 2015) such that the principal can react to it. Even creative workers are in need of
an Autonomy Supportive leadership behavior (Mumford et al., 2002) to preserve their efforts.
Regarding the benefit-cost ratio, companies may be concerned about costs in training team
leaders in Autonomy Support5 as to introduce Autonomy Support. We would expect trained
team leaders to then actually have a lower marginal cost α. Even then, assessing the poten-
tial benefit from small scale innovation vP is hard, especially when a company has no prior
5 Fixed costs do not change the qualitative results of our model, but slightly shift the thresholds.
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experience in innovating. We believe this may be the most constraining factor in providing
Autonomy Support. In the example of Toyota and its opponent GM, GM apparently did not
believe its workforce capable of innovation resulting in profits, such that the thought of pro-
viding Autonomy Support may have never occurred.
In this chapter, we focus on investments in Autonomy Support that encourage innovative ac-
tivities. Autonomy and Autonomy Support however have been generally found to positively
impact well-being and performance of individuals (Gagné and Deci, 2005). A natural exten-
sion of our model is therefore to include a standard task. We make the case that Autonomy
Support must be properly designed to be encourage innovation. But as this involves looking
deeply into the task at hand and how to improve it, it seems obvious that even Autonomy Sup-
port tailored towards innovative activity would to some extend spill over to effort in the stan-
dard task. As this increases the principal’s profits from innovation and regular business from
the same investments, it amounts to an increase in vP in our model, resulting in higher invest-
ments, investments in more periods, and investments for agents with smaller initial amounts
of Autonomy Support. The interaction between standard and innovative task could, for exam-
ple, be captured by allowing successful innovation to directly reduce effort costs in the stan-
dard task. Additionally to the agent’s benefit from innovation v A, currently the utility from
being active, this generates a direct utility advantage. Generally, a model incorporating the
standard task needs to include a monetary exchange. As shown in the literature review, mon-
etary incentives do not facilitate generating creative ideas, posing the interesting question of
whether innovation efforts should be compartmentalized as to not be perceived to have mon-
etary rewards.
2.6 Conclusion
Our research contributes to the discussion on optimal management practices. Instead of iso-
lating the effect of a single management practice, we focus on the impact of Autonomy Sup-
portive leadership behavior on innovative effort. Leadership behavior is not contingent on
a specific management practice, it can or cannot arise within one structure (Amabile et al.,
2004), but may more readily appear in a management practice designed for support, such
as in our introductory example of Toyota’s Kaizen. Nonetheless, Autonomy Support fosters a
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feeling of Autonomy, an innovative action, only when given frequently, and in accordance to
the worker’s need. Providing this Autonomy Support is therefore an investment on behalf of
the supervisor.
In this chapter, we demonstrate the optimal investment patterns in Autonomy Support over
time that fosters small scale innovation. Small scale innovation describes creative, uncon-
strained innovative efforts of an agent. We review research showing that monetary incentives
are restricted in their effectiveness for unconstrained innovation but that an Autonomy Sup-
portive leadership behavior successfully instills innovative efforts. Leadership behavior un-
folds over time, as a single intervention’s effectiveness fades out over time. Informed by the
literature, we build a two-period model of the principal’s optimal investments in Autonomy
Support. We find that when the principal values future benefits from innovative effort, she
tends to invest already in the first period. When future benefits are not strongly valued, the
principal tends to retouch depreciated Autonomy Support levels in the second period. Our
model also suggests a certain substitutability between investments and the agent’s initial Au-
tonomy Support level, which he has accrued in previous (personal or professional) relation-
ships. However, screening for agents with high initial Autonomy Support, or creativity levels,
does not resolve the need to invest in Autonomy Supportive leadership behavior, echoing the
literature (Mumford et al., 2002). Expanding the results of our two-period model indicates that
even individuals with relatively high initial levels should be invested in at some point to pre-
serve their innovative efforts. Workers endowed with almost zero initial Autonomy support
receive no investments in our model; with a wide time horizon, investments in them become
more likely.
One can argue that some supervisors already manage their workforce intuitively in this way.
However, as a non-monetary incentive, Autonomy Support may have interactions with other
incentives and should be provided consciously and in a structured way. As is the case with
incentives in general, Autonomy Support must be tailored to be conducive to the desired out-
come, in our case innovation, and given in the required intensity. Our research contributes
thus to the discussion on non-monetary incentives, but we do not add yet another tool to the
incentive toolbox. The concept of Autonomy Support touches upon motivation through de-
cision rights, rewards, verbal praise and knowledge sharing, but encompasses these factors to
feed into a feeling of Autonomy that successfully instills motivation (Gagné and Deci, 2005).
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In this, Autonomy Support allows us to expand our understanding of how known incentives
effectively work together. We further point towards time dependent need and effectiveness of
incentives.
We also demonstrate that different leadership behavior intensity can constitute optimal Au-
tonomy Support, as optimal investments depend on the agent’s initial level. Leadership of
a team then entails that the same action inspires different levels of Autonomy Support for
each group member. It is therefore the responsibility of the team leader to understand which
actions and behaviors must be taken on a team and which on an individual level in order to
provide the Autonomy Support needed for each team member. With an Autonomy Supportive
leadership style, the supervisor outgrows the role of controlling the workforce; she becomes a
service provider who helps her team achieve the best for the entire organization.
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Chapter 3
The Dry Powder Paradox of Monetary
Policy*
3.1 Introduction
Should central bankers be rewarded for keeping interest rates up? And should monetary policy
“keep its powder dry” in anticipation of deteriorating economic conditions? The notion of dry
powder assumes that the maximum potential effectiveness of monetary policy is a state vari-
able that follows a stochastic process dependent on past (and future) use of it. In typical mod-
els designed for studying “optimal” monetary policy and its role for macroeconomic stabi-
lization, monetary policy cannot be stored and thus, interest rate setting is a state-contingent
equilibrium process, not a goal of stabilization itself. In this chapter, we shed light on the the-
oretical underpinning of this dry powder view and answer the question of whether a central
bank should set interest rates precautionarily according to the New Keynesian paradigm. A
central bank is said to set interest rates precautionarily if it has asymmetric preferences con-
cerning deviations of interest rates from their natural level.
The narrative of dry powder is prevalent across professionals and the public regarding both
monetary and fiscal policy. There are several instances where headlines after meetings of the
governing council of the Fed, the ECB, or the Bank of England make explicit reference to the
* This chapter is based on joint work with Markus Epp (University of Freiburg).
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argument.2 The argument resounds when economic conditions are expected to deteriorate
in the near future so that further interest rate cuts are expected to be necessary. While there
is some consensus about the notion of “fiscal space”, i.e. the limited capacity of governments
to run deficits (due to borrowing limits and Laffer curves in taxation revenues or seignorage),
the potential of interest rate cuts to amplify economic activity is, presumably, restrained by a
binding lower bound on the nominal interest rate as in (Brunnermeier and Koby, 2016), also
referred to as the reversal rate. Hence, a potential rationale for promoting the "dry-powder-
argument" might be that setting interest rates (precautionarily) above their natural level may
offer some leeway with respect to such a binding constraint.
Note that in this chapter, we do not attempt to answer the question of whether central banks
actually "keep their powder dry" and set interest rates precautionarily. This clearly is an em-
pirical question that goes beyond the scope of the present work. Further, we acknowledge
that finding conclusive evidence for this point may prove challenging because several fac-
tors impair the distinction of central banks’ motives: First, conflicting regional interests ob-
fuscate a clear distinction of fundamental components from deliberate precaution in driving
observed monetary policy, a problem particularly associated with heterogeneous monetary
unions like the eurozone. Second, central banks’ might exhibit hidden preferences for inter-
est rate smoothing.3
We do not attempt to settle the controversy around deviations of actual interest rate setting
from natural interest rates with this work, not to mention the associated difficulties arising
with estimations of the latter. Instead, we analyze institutional circumstances under which
precautionary interest rate setting (PIRS) may or may not occur as an equilibrium outcome in
the New Keynesian core model, as well as the welfare consequences when it does.
Given the central bank has a dual mandate with a certain degree of freedom in putting weights
on price stability and economic activity, our results are as follows: First, letting a discretionary
central banks’ objective function also host explicit preferences for keeping positive interest
rates, the associated PIRS yields the dry powder paradox: it leads to a deflationary bias and
lower output gaps which in turn lead to on average lower nominal interest rates.
2 See The Economist (2014) on Feb 6th: “Keeping its powder dry”; Goodman (2019) in Bloomberg.com on Dec
19th: “Bank of England Keeps Powder Dry as Brexit Moves Into Next Stage”, or Brzeski (2020) on Apr 30th:
"ECB: Keeping its powder dry".
3 Woodford (2003) shows that such behavior might be optimal even when society has no explicit preference
for smooth interest rates.
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Nevertheless, the created deflationary bias can be helpful when addressing the time inconsis-
tency problem, which arises when the central bank cannot commit to a policy plan and the
economy’s steady-state is distorted (or alternatively: perceived to be distorted). We show that
the welfare-optimal incentive for positive nominal interest rates has closed-form expressions.
If the central bank and society have asymmetric preferences with respect to their weights on
the output gap, depicted in their loss functions, the optimal incentive is strictly positive if the
central bank is less "conservative" in comparison. Further, if the preferences perfectly coin-
cide, the size of the optimal incentive is still strictly positive due to the welfare gains it provides
by being a tool to overcome the time inconsistency problem. Further, our analysis shows that
introducing the interest rate objective explicitly allows the central bank to balance its response
to shocks with its goal to obtain a certain deflationary bias.
However, the welfare gains due to PIRS arising from overcoming the time inconsistency prob-
lem vanish when a central bank can credibly commit. In this case, a higher incentive for pos-
itive nominal interest rates yields on average higher nominal interest rates which in turn lead
to higher inflation in the long-run. Hence, when the objective actually is to create some leeway
away from a binding zero lower bound – a case in which the central bank is unable to match
the decrease in the natural rate of interest with a proportional reduction in its policy interest
rate due to a binding constraint for the latter – such a reward might help to accomplish that
goal. In other words, given the central bank can credibly commit and thereby anchor expec-
tations, our theory states that a reward on positive nominal interest rates can be used to avoid
potential market fragilities at the zero(or effective)-lower bound (Fischer, 2016; Orphanides,
2020). Nevertheless, not-considering the existence of an effective lower bound, there is no
welfare-argument in this case for a positive weight on keeping interest rates at higher levels.
Additionally, our analysis elucidates the potential for PIRS to be a valid strategy for a central
bank having the objective of keeping control over its instruments to fulfill its mandate(s): it
can be a tool to avoid the scenario of "fiscal dominance", in which interest expenses of a gov-
ernment cannot be covered by tax collection or rollovers quickly enough, such that the cen-
tral bank might be tempted or even forced to sacrifice its main policy instrument to sustain
government-solvency.
The chapter is structured as follows: in Section 3.2, we review the related literature. Section
3.3 highlights the role of incentivizing a central bank for positive nominal interest rates in the
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New Keynesian model with discretionary and/or commitment policies, bringing about the dry
powder paradox as well as a resulting welfare analysis. Section 3.4 presents PIRS in a setup of
potential institutional conflict between a central bank and fiscal policy, in which its role for
disciplining public spending is analyzed. Section 3.5 concludes this chapter.
3.2 Related Literature
Our approach builds on several branches of literature analyzing welfare effects of interest rate
policy regimes by using the framework of the New Keynesian model, which presents the core
amongst various strands of DSGE models. First, our conducted welfare analysis is located in-
side the area of research assessing macroeconomic effects of commitment of a central bank
and the potentially inefficient outcomes implied by purely discretionary policies, in particu-
lar, in the presence of a (suboptimal) positive inflation bias due to time inconsistency (Kyd-
land and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983; Walsh, 2003; Galí, 2018). As, for example,
the analysis of Clarida et al. (1999) shows, a central bank that is able to credibly commit to
a choice of an optimal monetary policy plan that simply is followed through afterwards can
overcome the inconsistency in hand and reduce the resulting welfare losses due to the pos-
sibility of stimulating the (rational) expectations of the economic agents about future output
gaps and inflation rates. In contrast, a central bank only capable of acting discretionary, i.e.
period-per-period, does not take into account the effect of its policy at one point in time on its
own objective in previous and later periods and thus, generates outcomes which are inferior
with respect to welfare, i.e. higher positive output gaps only a the expense of higher average
inflation.
In our approach, we show that the inclusion of an artificial optimally specified reward (or
weight) on keeping interest rates on average on a higher level for a central banker might serve
as a remedy for the welfare losses in the discretionary case by providing an incentive to reach
the desired lower average level of inflation.
Further, our analysis also contributes to the game-theoretical literature about how a govern-
ment/a society optimally delegates monetary policy to a central bank (Illing, 1997) and the
kind/degree of a central bank’s autonomy. According to Fischer (1995), one can distinguish
between goal independence and instrument independence. The first expression refers to a
70
THE DRY POWDER PARADOX OF MONETARY POLICY
regime in which a central banker is elected by a government but afterwards is autonomous
in the determination of her goals. The latter expression refers to a scenario in which the goals
for a central bank are pre-specified, but it is free in its choice of instruments to reach them.
In its results, our approach can be interpreted in both ways: First, our set-up may represent
an attempt to optimally design a contract for central bankers (Persson and Tabellini, 1993;
Walsh, 1995; Svensson, 1997; Rostagno et al., 2019). The roots of this modelling approach lie
in contract theory, referring to an efficient incentivization of an agent by a principal. In the
context of monetary policy, this implies that a central bank gets an explicitly formulated con-
tract, specifying rewards dependent on a specified set of goals (Reis, 2013). The inclusion of
an explicit reward for higher interest rates is in line with such a modelling approach.
Nevertheless, our set-up can also be related to Rogoff (1985) who proposed the election of a
conservative central banker in presence of the issue of dynamic inconsistency. In contrast
to specifying a contract rewarding higher nominal interest rates, a government/society might
simply elect a central banker exhibiting preferences consistent with that goal. This point of
view is more in line with goal independence. After the delegation of monetary policy, such
a central banker is independent in picking her goals according to her preferences as well as
the instruments to reach it. Both types of modelling are in line with our analysis and do not
change the results presented below. Thus, we refrain from making an explicit choice about the
exact scenario.
In its results, our approach contributes to the literature evaluating optimal policies in the pres-
ence of a binding effective/zero lower bound (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Jung et al.,
2005; Adam and Billi, 2007; Nakov, 2008; Nakata and Schmidt, 2019). With a zero lower bound
constraint, there is no guarantee that the central bank is capable of stabilizing the economy
in a downturn, leading, for example, to a reduction in output and an overall decrease in eco-
nomic welfare (Galí, 2018). The existence of a binding lower bound might be one of the in-
tuitive rationales for rewards for central bankers to sustain higher nominal interest rates in
the first place. Hence, our work contributes to this literature by showing that this policy, even
though it appears intuitive, potentially causes adverse effects on the average level of interest
rates. Thus, it cannot unequivocally be considered as appropriate to achieve the underlying
goal of gaining distance to a binding lower bound.
Furthermore, our approach contributes to the literature concerning optimal monetary policy
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design in the New Keynesian model in the presence of fiscal dominance, or the threat of un-
sustainable fiscal policies (De Resende and Rebei, 2008; Kumhof et al., 2010; Leith and Wren-
Lewis, 2013; Dufrénot et al., 2018). Our focus thereby is not so much on potential policies
providing a remedy given the state of fiscal dominance already occurred but about potential
measures a central bank can take to prevent such a situation in the first place.
3.3 The Dry Powder Paradox in the New Keynesian Model
To illustrate the dry powder paradox, we base our analysis on Gali’s structural framework (Galí,
2015, ch. 3-5) which became the industry standard of linear monetary policy analysis and the
point of departure for more intricate DSGE models. It consists of the following equations:
xt = Et xt+1 −σ−1[it −Etπt+1 − r et ] (3.1)
πt =βEtπt+1 +κxt (3.2)
where xt = yt − yet is the output gap defined as the deviation of the log of output from its ef-
ficient level yet , and where r
e
t is the natural rate of interest consistent with the efficient level
of output. Our analysis thus allows for deviations of the desirable output gap from its natural
level ynt . Both y
e
t ≥ ynt are assumed to be determined by structural parameters and technolog-
ical capacities consistent with a zero-inflation steady state. σ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, β is the steady state discount factor and κ is function of technological parame-
ters.
This model is usually derived from households’ optimization on their intertemporal allocation
of consumption plus the labor-leisure trade-off, entering the optimal staggered price setting
of firms as a measure of marginal cost. After market-clearing (and log-linearization around a
zero-inflation steady state), the household’s Euler equation prescribes an IS-relationship (3.1)
while optimal price setting implies the well-known New Keynesian Phillips curve (3.2).
A second-order approximation of the consumer’s corresponding optimization problem yields
that social welfare losses relevant for monetary policy are proportional to the following func-
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where α̂ and λ̂ are coefficients of structural parameters.4 Note that this welfare loss can be
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)− λ̂E0xt] (3.4)
which allows us to disentangle the losses created by the stochastic environment (represented
by ut and r et in the structural description (3.1) and (3.2)) from the average biases in policy-
making. These are relevant for comparing monetary policy frameworks consistent with iden-
tical responses to exogenous events.
In practice, central banks do not observe the structural parameters and thus have either dif-
ferent preferences than α̂ and λ̂ or incomplete knowledge about them. We denote the central
bank’s (potentially differing) preferences by α and λ. A central bank’s loss function consistent
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where Φ is the steady state distortion, 1−θ is the production elasticity of labor, ϕ is the Frisch-elasticity of
labor supply, ε the substitution elasticity of goods and ω̂ is a function that is strictly decreasing in the degree
of price stickiness, in the return to labour as well as the demand-elasticity. Similar proofs can be found
in King and Kerr (1996), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), McCallum and
Nelson (1997).
5 Central banks’ legitimacy in most developed economies is mandated to price stability and the support of
economic growth aside maintenance of financial stability by means of liquidity provision.
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where λ=αx̄, and x̄ is the socially desired output gap.6








(π2t +αx2t )−λxt −δit
]
(3.7)
subject to (3.1) and (3.2). Since we are not interested in the dynamics at the lower bound itself
but in the leeway a central bank has towards a lower bound, we neglect the explicit zero-lower
bound constraint. The existence of such a lower bound only affects the relative comparison
between discretionary and commitment solutions. Note, however, that the term δit can be
interpreted as a reward for setting interest rates above the zero-level, i.e. above a lower bound
ī = 0.
We stick to the usual denomination of α as a measure of how “conservative” the central bank
is. In contrast, the parameter δ can be understood as a measure of how “Fisherian” the cen-
tral bank is: it determines the nominal interest rate that the central bank is willing to set on
average in order to anchor inflation expectations, given that long-run real interest rates are
determined exogenously.7 As will be illustrated, the Fisherian parameter allows the central
bank to disentangle long-run biases from a desired amount of “dry powder”, i.e. a long-run
distance from hitting the zero-lower bound.
In order to verify these results, we will compare welfare losses and desirability of parame-
ter δ in the central banks’ loss function to achieve socially preferred outcomes under uncer-
tainty concerning α̂ and λ̂. We start our analysis for two popular regimes of credibility: in
the first regime, the central bank cannot commit to paths of the interest rate, often referred to
as “discretionary” monetary policy; in the second regime, the central bank commits to state-
contingent paths of interest rates.
First, we will illustrate that the central bank can mitigate its time inconsistency problem that
occurs under discretion. This will allow the central bank to get closer to the optimal inflation-
ary (and thus output-)bias.
6 In the New Keynesian model with steady state distortions, i.e. a long-run equilibrium deviating from the
flexible price equilibrium, this “efficient” output gap arises naturally as a means to address inefficiently low
production due to monopolistic competition.
7 Put differently, δ is the relative weight a central banker puts on keeping the powder dry vis-a-vis its dual
mandate.
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3.3.1 Rational expectations equilibrium: The discretionary case
Suppose the central bank cannot credibly commit to paths of interest rates. As a result, the
central bank is only able to engage in per-period optimization. Following Galí (2015), the
central bank takes expectations to be predetermined and thus the structural constraints as
given
πt = κxt +νt ,
xt =−σ−1(it − r et )+γt .
which assumes that supply-side cost-pressure νt = βEtπt+1 +ut and demand-pull inflation
γt = Et xt+1+σ−1Etπt+1 are exogenously determined and thus are fixed values from the central
bank’s perspective.




{xt ,πt ,it }t≥0
{
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∣∣∣πt = κxt +νt , it = r et +σ(γt −xt )}]
where i = {P,T } indicates the central bank’s interest rate regimes as in (3.7) and (3.6). We
neglect asymmetric inflation targets. Discretionary solutions can be found by looking at per-






(π2t +αx2t )−λxt −δit
∣∣∣πt = κxt +νt , it = r et +σ(γt −xt )} (3.8)
Note that the New Keynesian IS curve is now required as a constraint since it is directly relevant
for the losses incurred by the central bank due to the direct effects of it via δ.
Interior solutions are characterized by
(α+κ2)xt +δσ−λ+κνt = 0
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Note thatδ= 0 generates the usual discretionary solution for a distorted steady state andλ> 0.
Further, (3.11) can be interpreted as a Taylor-type interest rate setting rule. Note also that ex-
pressions (3.9) - (3.10) exhibit the usual leaning-against-the-wind properties: aside from the
biases (constant terms in πt and xt ), the expressions multiplied with supply-side inflation
pressures νt imply the usual sacrifice ratio xt =−καπt .8
For comparison, the common solutions under discretion and in absence of steady state dis-





which also illustrates that the reaction to variations of supply-sided inflation will be virtually
equivalent under the assumed new structure of the central bank’s loss function.9
The biases imply permanent positive/negative output gaps created by keeping the interest
rate significantly below/above the natural rate of interest. The reactions to supply-side driven
inflation νt = βEtπt+1 +ut and “demand shocks” γt = Et xt+1 +σ−1Etπt+1 also mean that the
Taylor principle is applied, since the coefficient on inflation expectations exceeds unity by
αβ/(α+κ2), which is larger than zero under the usual assumptions on parameters.
Inserting the explicit expressions for νt and γt , the dynamics of the equilibrium under the new
8 Hence, this type of monetary policy is observationally equivalent to typical inflation targeting: the model
predicts a negative empirical relationship between inflation and output gaps, as in McLeay and Tenreyro
(2020).
9 Without structural distortions or preferences over the instrument it , the interest rate rule needs to be speci-
fied by the researcher such that the model produces a unique solution. The proof of this result can be found
in Bullard and Mitra (2002). Galí (2015) discusses the regions of determinacy for several rules in ch. 4.
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and hence the solution is unique when α(β−1) < κ2, which is true for the standard assump-
tions of the parameters, i.e. α > 0, β ∈ [0,1) and κ being non-negative. This property carries
over to variations of the model where νt has some exogenous stochastic component addi-
tional to inflation expectations.
The model’s solution can thus be computed by iterating the inflation solution forward and
inserting it back into the equation for the output gap, or simply using the method of undeter-
mined coefficients. Using the latter, the solutions of πt and xt can be expressed as
xt = x(δ)+χuut +χr r et
πt =π(δ)+ψuut +ψr r et
with intercepts x(δ), π(δ) and coefficients χu ,χr ,ψu ,ψr .
We highlight that the intercepts are functions of δ by specifying them as x(δ) and π(δ) which
are determined independently of shocks. To see this, note that the constant non-stochastic
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which are not dependent on the stochastic structure of the shocks. Note also that the typical
long-run Phillips curve holds and implies that there is no inflation-output trade-off in the long
run since x = 1−βκ π.
Under the assumption of ut and r et following auto-regressive processes with persistence ρu
and ρr , respectively, expectations of πt and the output gap xt are given by
Et xt+1 = x(δ)+χuρuut +χrρr r et
Etπt+1 =π(δ)+ψuρuut +ψrρr r et






α(1−β)+κ2 . We abstract here from stating parameters χu ,χr ,ψu ,ψr and the resulting
φr ,φu explicitly since their exact specification is unimportant for the results in hand.
This solution for the equilibrium interest rate illustrates the dry powder paradox: the equi-
librium interest rates are lower despite the central bank’s incentive to set higher interest rates.
The reason is that the direct incentive to set higher interest rates, as expressed in (3.11), is more
than offset by reduced inflation and output expectations, anchored at lower average levels due
to the deflationary effect caused by δ > 0. Thus, the central bank will set lower interest rates
than it otherwise would. In other words, δ works as a counter to the inflationary bias created
by the steady state distortion and yields an incentive to tolerate deflation and negative output
gaps.
By iterating optimality conditions (3.9) and (3.10), it also becomes clear that δ affects only the
intercepts, not the responses of endogenous variables to exogenous variations in ut and r et .
Note that this solution is consistent with the Fisher-equation holding in the shock-free (that
is non-stochastic) steady state. In the long-run, the PIRS-Taylor-rule and the Fisher equation
both imply
it = r et +π(δ)
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which implies that nominal interest rates are determined by the stochastic process underlying
the natural rate of interest and the choice of δ. However, since π′(δ) < 0, not only the average
inflation rate is smaller under precautionary interest rate setting but also the nominal inter-
est rate, which is the essence of the dry powder paradox. There is no trade-off between the
Fisher effect and the typical impact of higher interest rates on inflation since in the rational
expectations equilibrium both effects point in the same direction.
3.3.2 Welfare analysis: Overcoming the time inconsistency problem
In the present framework, the inflationary bias is a result of the temptation to address steady
state distortions using monetary policy, which will give rise to Kydland and Prescott’s popular
time inconsistency problem of discretionary policies (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). Consistent
with the model above, the central bank is said to have an inflationary bias when λ > 0. Note
that this inflationary bias is more aligned with society’s preferences the closer it is to λ̂> 0.
In what follows, we illustrate that the inflationary bias in the New Keynesian model arises pri-
marily because of the distortions to the steady state, which makes some deviation of inflation
from zero optimal. We thereby exploit that the reaction to exogenous shocks is equivalent un-
der all values of δ under discretionary policy (as illustrated by our results above).
First, note that the differences in welfare losses are proportional to the biases in (3.4), so that
welfare comparisons of different discretionary policy schemes come down to assessing differ-
















where we exploit the following two points: (i) unconditional expectations E0πt coincide with
both the average inflation π̄ in a certainty-equivalent steady state, and the non-stochastic
steady state of the model (ii) the long-run Phillips curve prescribes x = 1−βκ π̄, implying that
Ψ(α̂) := 1 + α̂[(1−β)/κ]2 > 1 and, most importantly, that society cannot attain xt = x̄ and
πt = 0 in the long-run in the presence of rational expectations.
As we have shown above, the discretionary central bank sets π̄ for a given δ and λ according
to expression (3.13).
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When society and central bank share the perception of an undistorted steady state x̄ = 0 (or
alternatively, λ̂ = λ = 0), expression (3.15) immediately implies that δ = 0 is unambiguously
optimal for welfare. If the natural level of output is not inefficiently low, a central bank is al-
ways capable to achieve zero inflation and no output gap on average, commonly referred to
as the Divine Coincidence (Blanchard and Galí, 2007). The inclusion of an incentive to keep
nominal interest rates higher on average in this case only leads to an artificially created defla-
tionary bias and negative output gaps which clearly is welfare inferior.
In contrast, suppose that the steady state is distorted so that society’s preferences have λ̂> 0,
which implies that policy frameworks with discretionary leaning-against-the-wind are evalu-
ated with regard to the trade-off expressed in (3.15). When the central bank adopts λ > 0 to
conform λ̂ > 0, optimal discretionary monetary policy produces the well-known inflationary
bias which for the given model is given by λ/((1−β)α+κ2) (see the discretionary solution
(3.10) for δ= 0). Under these circumstances, the deflationary bias created by δ> 0 can help to
offset the time inconsistency problem that arises.














where we find π∗ by minimizing (3.15) with respect to π̄. Afterwards, we use the long-run
Philips curve to find x∗.
The results illustrate that in the presence of the long-run correlation between inflation and
output deviations, society cannot reach the allocation xt = x̄ and πt = 0 and thus picks the
middle ground with some inflation and some output stimulus.
Time inconsistency implies that a non-committing central bank reaching out for x̄ will fail to
achieve this goal if agents with rational expectations take the central bank’s per-period incen-
tives into account and will only achieve (3.16) by coincidence. Nevertheless, picking an op-
timal incentive scheme δ can remedy this situation: according to the biases in discretionary
solutions, equations (3.12), (3.13) show how the average inflation and output gap are deter-
mined for δ> 0.
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Hence, we can use, e.g., expressions (3.16) and (3.13) to solve π∗ = π(δ) for the optimal value








which is weakly positive if α≥ α̂, i.e. when the central bank puts more weight on output gaps
than society. The inequality holds only weakly because, as already mentioned above, δ∗ = 0 if
x̄ = 0: the time inconsistency problem does not arise if society and central bank agree that the
steady state is undistorted.
Another interesting result arises when the case of α= α̂ is considered, i.e. society and central
bank agree on the weight they put on a non-negative output gap. Expression (3.18) can be







holds. This result shows that the optimal reward for positive interest rates, depending on the
weight the central bank puts on the output gap aside structural parameters, is still positive.
The reason is that the deflationary bias created by δ represents a welfare improving counter-
effect to the inflationary bias innate to the time-inconsistency problem: if a central bank can-
not credibly commit, it fails to achieve the optimal inflation level π∗ without the additional
bias induced by δ because agents with rational expectations know that the central bank is sub-
ject to its per-period incentive to achieve x̄. A discretionary central bank with δ= 0 that would
announce to pursue an inflation target π∗ has an incentive to deviate to a higher level of infla-
tion to reach the desired output gap x̄. Since the economic agents hold rational expectations,
however, they would anticipate this deviation, leading to the inflation bias. Thus, a positive δ∗
addressing this bias by providing a credible incentive for the central bank to pursue π∗ is still
welfare improving, even when the preferences of society and central bank formally coincide.
Note that for the economy converging to the flexible price equilibrium, i.e. κ→ 0, this expres-
sion simply boils down to δ∗ = 0. The reason is that in this case, the New Keynesian Phillips
curve (expression (3.2)) states that there is no connection between a positive output gap and
inflation. Thus, a discretionary central bank can reach the desired output gap x̄ without infla-
tionary bias. This implies that there is no need for a positive δ in this case.
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3.3.3 Commitment solution: Fisher effects of interest rate rewards
When the central bank can commit, it will take implications for future inflation and output
gaps into consideration when choosing inflation and output today. It is well-known that cred-
ible commitments of the central bank to state-contingent paths of future interest rates help
the central bank to replenish the solution to the Ramsey problem of minimizing (3.6) subject
to (3.2), typically referred to as forward guidance solution. Hence the question here is not so
much about potential improvements of the reward δ but about the qualitative implications
such a reward may have on interest rate setting as well as on the “stock of dry powder”, i.e. the
distance from the zero/effective lower bound a central bank will have on average.
Again using the set-up presented in Galí (2015) as a foundation, the central bank’s optimiza-
tion scheme can be expressed by the following Lagrangian, when confronted with the incen-








(π2t +αx2t )−λxt −δ[σ(xt+1 −xt )+πt+1 + r et ]+µt (πt −κxt −βπt+1 −ut )
]
(3.19)
where {µt }∞t=0 denotes a sequence of Lagrange multipliers.
Thus, the necessary conditions to characterize optimality are given by
αx0 −λ+δσ= κµ0
π0 +µ0 = 0
and, ∀t > 0
βt [αxt −λ+δσ−κµt ]−βt−1[δσ] = 0
βt [πt +µt ]−βt−1[δ+βµt−1] = 0
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Eliminating the Lagrangian multipliers, we get a single equation correlating inflation and out-








, ∀t > 0
which shows that precautionary interest rate setting survives in the commitment solutions as
a permanent inflationary bias in all periods.
Given the ex ante equality of unconditional expectations E0xt = E0xt−1 inflation’s uncondi-




which illustrates that the central bank has an inflationary bias in this case. This can be at-
tributed directly to the Fisher effect: since the central bank can engineer higher nominal in-
terest rates in the future by increasing inflation expectations today it is tempted to move along
a higher average inflation path. This “backfiring” of the Fisher effect can be directly attributed
to the dependence of the IS curve (3.1) on real, not nominal interest rates: since the incentives
of central bankers to raise inflation are permanent, inflation expectations will be higher in ev-
ery equilibrium.
Now it is straightforward to show that the standard log-linearization of the inflation rate, i.e.
the definition πt = pt −pt−1, the starting value p−1 and the starting bias λ−σδ2κ can be used to
iterate for a solution of the price level, such that the price level definition that suffers from




where p̃t = pt − p̂t , and p̂t = p−1 + δβ t + λ−σδ2κ − 2ακ which captures the result that the central
bank pursues a positive inflation target and has a sacrifice ratio between output gaps and the
deviation of the price level pt from its deterministic growth path
δ
β
t . This is to say that the
central bank expects and commits to some constant price level appreciation.
Reformulating the IS-curve depicted in (3.1), note also that we can express the interest rate
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equation as
it = r et +Etπt+1 +σEt [xt+1 −xt ]
which can be rewritten with the help of the expectations of the optimality condition under
commitment. Thus, the following expression for the nominal interest rate can be derived:








Et [xt+1 −xt ] (3.22)
Using once again the ex-ante equality of unconditional expectations E0xt = E0xt−1, the un-
conditional expectation of it is given by




Hence, due to the positive reward δ, the central bank gains on average higher nominal interest
rates at the cost of a positive inflationary bias when it can commit to a policy plan.
3.3.4 Discussion of results
The analysis presented above sheds some light on the different effects of a positive δ on the
optimal policy of a central bank and the corresponding welfare effects. In particular, when
considering the introduction of such an incentive, an important point to measure its effec-
tiveness is the ultimate goal for which it was introduced.
First, consider the case in which PIRS is considered to avoid interest rates coming to close to
an effective lower bound. Using our analysis from above, we have shown that whether the
resulting effect of introducing an incentive δ is inflationary or deflationary crucially hinges
on the central bank’s ability of commitment. I.e., whether a reward on higher interest rates
actually leads to higher interest rates depends on a central bank’s ability to commit to a policy
plan.
Given a central bank’s inability to commit, δ > 0 anchors inflation and output gap expecta-
tions on a lower average level. As a result, those effects overcompensate the direct effect on it
and lead to lower nominal interest rates, on average. Thus, when the goal of the policymaker
actually is to get some leeway away from an effective lower bound and the central bank can
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only act discretionary, δ> 0 is a counter-productive instrument because it leads to the above
mentioned dry powder paradox.
On the other hand, the commitment case obviates the Fisher effect, since commitment re-
moves the time inconsistency so that only the permanent effect of precautionary interest rate
setting inflation survives. If a δ > 0 is used in this case, the central bank is able to engage in
some "fine-tuning" of long-run inflation to its desired level, accompanied by higher average
nominal interest rates.
Second, consider the case of introducing PIRS to improve welfare. From a purely welfare-
oriented point of view, without considering the existence of a zero/effective lower bound, a
positive reward for nominal interest rates makes no sense in the commitment case: As e.g.
Galí (2015) shows, a central bank can address the time inconsistency problem without δ > 0
in such a case and reaches the social optimum. Using its optimal plan {πt , xt }∞t=0, it is able to
(asymptotically) reach an equilibrium with zero average inflation and no average output gap.
Since the public anticipates this outcome, this policy enables the central bank to achieve pos-
itive output gaps at lower inflation in the short-run.
If commitment is not an available option and assuming a distorted steady state, however, the
analysis above demonstrates that the deflationary bias a δ > 0 causes is welfare-enhancing
because it presents a counter effect to the inflationary bias of a central bank and thereby ad-
dresses the time inconsistency problem. This, of course, only holds for as long as a distorted
steady state, i.e. the positive inflationary bias, exists. In absence of this case, any incentive to
artificially set higher nominal interest rates is welfare inferior in comparison to e.g. the stan-
dard Taylor interest rate rule that is able to establish on average zero inflation and no output
gap in equilibrium (Woodford, 2003).
3.4 Strategic Reasons for Precautionary Interest Rate Setting
Does a reward for higher interest rates help the central bank to keep fiscal policy in check?
The underlying assumption of this question is that fiscal policy tends to run unsustainable
deficits, antagonizes stabilization attempts of central banks, or at least induces an amount of
economic activity inconsistent with the dual mandate of the central bank. A rich literature has
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studied these hypotheses and continuous to do so.10 Without taking a stand in these debates,
we study an extreme situation which arises when the central bank has to keep fiscal policy
afloat by monetizing deficits in the treasury: a situation that arises naturally even when the
government keeps deficits contained in expectations, but where the price stability mandate
urges increases in interest expenses which cannot be covered by tax collection or rollovers
quickly enough so that the central bank has to sacrifice its policy instrument to maintain the
solvency of the government. This situation is usually referred to as fiscal dominance and its
likelihood might depend positively on expansionary monetary policy followed by a quick and
significant turn to contractionary monetary policy. Piled-up fiscal deficits financed by debt
issuance during expansions then translate into higher interest expenses once the stance of
monetary policy is reversed. If the increase in public debt cannot be rolled over at the interest
rate set by the central bank, the treasury might face a self-enforcing spiral of insolvency. Hence
the question arises, whether the central bank can diminish chances for such a situation, for
example by providing additional incentives for debt consolidation, thereby encompassing its
dual mandate in a larger set of circumstances.
To answer this question within the New Keynesian model, we have to disclose the descrip-
tion of the government sector as is standard in the literature. First note that the structural
equations (3.1)-(3.2) above can be generalized to adhere fiscal policy, when interpreting xt as
the difference between deviations of total spending and potentials from their steady states (or
balanced growth paths).
The aggregate market-clearing condition (households’ budget identity) is
Yt =Ct +Gt (3.24)
In its log-linear version, it accommodates the New Keynesian model’s market-clearing
yt = ζct + (1−ζ)g t (3.25)
10 An early and very influential treatment of optimal fiscal policy was provided by Arrow and Kurz (1970). Cru-
cial contributions to the discussion of optimal fiscal policy rules are discussed in Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2000) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013).
86
THE DRY POWDER PARADOX OF MONETARY POLICY
where ζ and 1− ζ are the relative sizes of the private sector and the government spending in
a steady state (since ct = Ct−CY , g t = Gt−GY ), respectively. The typical Phillips curves (3.2) and
IS-curves (3.1) apply but feature the adjusted output gap xt = yt − yet where
xt = ζct + (1−ζ)g t − yet (3.26)
and where consumption is determined via the Euler equation
ct = Et ct+1 −σ−1[it −Etπt+1 − r et ] (3.27)
The market-clearing condition obviates that by means of accounting, the central bank has to
rely both on public and private sector demand in achieving the (price-)stabilizing output gap
by exhausting production potentials yet . For a given level of private activity, the output gap will
only be closed for sufficient public demand. The interpretation of the IS-curve (3.1) is usually
such that a sequence of consumption expenditures {ct } enables the path of output gaps {xt }
in a Ricardian way, where paths of government expenditures, taxation, deficits and and pub-
lic debt levels are exogenous, i.e. do not affect the real allocation {ct }. This is consistent with
public debt not reflecting real wealth to the private sector such that private activity is fully de-
termined by monetary policy. Public debt titles are thus the (only) riskless vehicle available to
households to smooth consumption over the infinite lifetime of the representative agent. This
will allow us to let government expenditures be determined exogenously, which is consistent
with optimal fiscal policy as found by Benigno and Woodford (2003) as well as the stochas-
tic processes estimated for fiscal policy in the empirical literature (Jonsson and Klein, 1996;
Traum and Yang, 2011; Barhoumi et al., 2016).
When all expenditures are financed using nominal short-term debt Bt and the central bank
ensures solvency of the treasury in all states of the world, public debt evolves as
B nt = (1+ it−1)B nt−1 +PtGt (3.28)
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for a given B n−1. Gt denotes real public expenditure (or primary deficits). Define real debt




so that the law of motion (3.28) implies
Bt = 1+ it
1+πt
Bt−1 + (1+ it )Gt (3.29)
which deviates from its stationary value according to a log-linear approximation (see Wood-
ford (1998), equ. (2.9)) as
βbt =βit +bt−1 −πt + (1−β)g t (3.30)
We will assume below that monetary policy keeps the treasury afloat at all times in order to
maintain the treasury’s ability to cover real interest expenses to the public. The central bank
will thus be subject to a constraint on interest rate setting, which will also consistently peg the
default probability to zero in every equilibrium.
Fiscal Dominance
We follow Blanchard (2004) by specifying a risk premium on government debt which arises
due to a default probability pt on government debt.11 Given this probability, expected returns
on government bonds would equal (1+ i Bt )(1− pt ), where bonds are priced via i Bt such that
they compensate risk averse market participants:
1+ i Bt = 1+ it +σpt (3.31)
where σ is the measure of risk aversion. The central bank sets pt = 0 by credibly committing
to bail out outstanding (nominal) claims on the treasury and thus ensures i Bt = it in this equi-
librium. We assume that all such equilibria can be indexed by a maximum capacity for rolling
over debt,Ωt :
Bt −Bt−1 ≤Ωt (3.32)
11 This default probability might alternatively capture the quasi-default event of financial repression and other
pay-off relevant remedies to sovereign insolvency.
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which by (3.29) immediately translates into a constraint on real interest expenses, given public
spending and the inflation shield
(it −πt )Bt−1 ≤ (1+πt )[Ωt − (1+ it )Gt ] (3.33)
where we think ofΩt as the time-varying capacities of the government to issue new debt on fi-
nancial markets and service old debt by means of (non-distortionary and revenue-enhancing)
taxation.
As we have seen above, the discretionary central bank is subject to the dry powder paradox,
which lowers both average inflation and nominal interest rates. Alternatively, as in the com-
mitment case, both average inflation and nominal interest rates rise in response to an increase
in incentives δ. This same-sign characteristic implies that the total effect of δ on the likelihood
to breach this condition becomes a quantitative question.
For discretionary monetary policy, we obtain the following result: as is shown in the Appendix,
increasing δ will reduce the likelihood to enter the stage of fiscal dominance if the size of the
government sector is sufficiently large in comparison to the maximum rollover capacity in the
steady state (G > Ω2 ). This finding is a result of the independence of real interest rates with
respect to δ and the fact that inflation affects the rollover limit and government expenditures
equally, while nominal interest rates affect the real value of government expenditures only.
Hence, there are two competing effects of higher values of δ: a common effect reducing gov-
ernment solvency due to lower inflation (first term on the RHS in (3.33)) but also a diminished
real cost of given government expenditures due to lower interest cost (second term in brackets
in (3.33)). Both effects are driven by the dry-powder paradox.
At first glance, these results appear to be somewhat counter-intuitive: in the discretionary
case, given a high level of government expenditures, the desirability of high values of δ does
not come from a disciplining effect of a positive δ on public expenditures. Rather, they orig-
inate from the lower average nominal interest rates, decreasing the direct costs of public ex-
penditures. Thus, these results hold because of the dry powder paradox we derived earlier.
Under commitment, the effects exactly revert: the increased cost of expenditures due to the
on average higher nominal interest rates only lead to an increased likelihood of entering the
stage of fiscal dominance for a central bank. Thus, under these circumstances, our theory
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states that a positive δ is an invalid tool for avoiding a situation of fiscal dominance.
Hence, there is again a trade-off involved with adopting rewards δ: under discretion, the
present framework predicts that δ helps reducing the likelihood of fiscal dominance scenar-
ios, but comes at the cost of a higher chance of encountering the zero-lower bound. Under
commitment, a central bank can gain additional leeway away from the lower bound, but only
at the expense of reduced government solvency.
3.5 Conclusion
Even though its validity is disputed by many economists, the argument that central banks
should "keep some powder dry" has sparkled the debate of monetary policy in the recent
episode of binding lower bounds on the nominal interest rate. Not assuming that the central
bank or professionals are irrational, the question arises why the narrative of storable nominal
interest rates is so resilient, in particular, when macroeconomic models suggest that higher
interest rates do not accomplish better stabilization, even in the presence of a binding lower
bound.
In this chapter, we have studied institutional and strategic rationales for the use of an explicit
incentive for a central bank to honor the DPA. We find that the structural rationale based on
its welfare improvement hinges on the commitment ability of a central bank as well as the ex-
istence of a distorted steady state in the discretionary case. But even though an explicit incen-
tive to increase nominal interest rates may help to overcome the time inconsistency problem,
it counter-intuitively is an invalid instrument to increase average nominal interest rates (i.e.,
gain some leeway away from a binding lower bound) because of the existing dry powder para-
dox: rational expectations with respect to inflation and the output gap are anchored at lower
average levels due to the deflationary bias this reward provides. This effect more than offsets
its direct positive effect on the nominal interest rate. Thus, PIRS only leads to average nominal
interest rates potentially moving even closer to an effective lower bound. Only if the central
bank can credibly commit to a policy plan, such a positive incentive can help to accomplish
higher average inflation rates due to higher nominal interest rates, as a result of the Fisherian
feature of the New Keynesian model.
Further, we have shown how setting interest rate precautionary can decrease the threat of
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fiscal dominance for a discretionary central bank. Interestingly, this result does not arise be-
cause of a disciplinary effect of PIRS on government expenditures. Rather, because it leads to
decreased real costs of expenditure for a government due to the existence of the dry powder
paradox. This result, however, was developed under the assumption that the path of govern-
ment spendings follows an exogenous process, rather than being determined endogenously.
Assuming that the government minimizes its own loss function would yield the best response
function, directly linking the optimal level of spending with the nominal interest rate level the
central bank sets. Thus, we think that considering feedback effects of interest rate setting on
public spending and strategic interaction between the government and fiscal policy is an in-
teresting avenue for extending the presented analysis.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study so far providing evidence on whether
central bankers actually honour the argument of keeping some "dry powder" when setting
their interest rates. We look forward to assessing the explanatory value of an interest rate pref-






A.1 Proposition 2: One sample prediction error
The statistically "correct" prediction error
According to von Auer (2005), the uncertainty associated with a prediction is captured by the
variance of the point prediction, i.e. V ar [m − An+1]. It can be expressed as
E [(m − An+1)2]−E [(m − An+1)]2 (A.1)
Since m is an unbiased estimator of the Expected value of An+1, and m and An+1 are indepen-
dent, this can be simplified to
E [(m −Xn+1)2] (A.2)
which is equivalent to
E [m2 −2mX +X 2n+1]
=E [m2]−2E [m]E [Xn+1]+E [X 2n+1]
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Knowing that for a random variable X , it holds that V ar [X ] = E [X 2]−E [X ]2, substitution leads
to the following expression
V ar [m2]+E [m]2 −2E [m]E [Xn+1]+V ar [Xn+1]+E [Xn+1]2
With m ∼ N (µ, σ2n ) and Xn+1 ∼ N (µ,σ2), I find that the above expression equals
σ2
n
+µ2 −2µ2 +σ2 +µ2





In contrast, the RENA believes to consider all possible data points in his sample and uses the
true distribution parameters with no innate estimation uncertainty. Thus, as, for example,
Geisser (1993) shows, all prediction uncertainty of using the mean as a predictor for a future
outcome comes from the variance of the respective random variable to be predicted. The
RENA (naively) assesses it via his sample-dispersion. Thus, the RENA believes his prediction













(m − Ai )2
)
=σ2
Hence, comparing both errors, the RENA underestimates the true uncertainty by a factor
n
n+1 , proving Proposition 2.
94
RANDOM ERROR NEGLECT
A.2 Proposition 3: Externally provided estimates
A.2.1 Correct assessment
In similar fashion to above, the accuracy of a fixed external predictor z is assessed. The correct
evaluation of the goodness of this constant as a predictor is
E [(z −Xn+1)2] (A.3)
which since z is exogenously given is equivalent to
z2 −2zE [Xn+1]+E [X 2n+1]
=z2 −2zµ+V ar [Xn+1]+E [Xn+1]2
=z2 −2zµ+µ2 +σ2
=σ2 + (z −µ)2
A.2.2 The RENA’s assessment
In turn, the RENA evaluates z similar to the previous section by using his sample data only, i.e.






(z − Ai )2]





































(m − Ai )2]
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since m = 1n
∑n




i=1(m − Ai )2] =σ2, this can be simplified to








(m − Ai )]
Due to the definition of m,
∑n
i=1(m − Ai )] = 0. Thus, what remains is
























σ2 + (z −µ)2) (A.4)
Hence, comparing both errors, the RENA overestimates the true uncertainty by a factor nn−1 ,
proving Proposition 3. In other words, he suffers from underprecision.
A.3 Proposition 4: Two sample case
The statistically "correct" prediction error
The complete proof strongly resembles the one from the section before. The statistically cor-
rect calculation of the prediction error of mA −mB in this case is
E {[(mA −mB )− (X −Y )]2} (A.5)
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because E [mA] =µx and E [mB ] =µy and hence {E [(mA −mB )− (X −Y )]}2 = 0.
Expression (B.1) can be rewritten as
E [(mA −mB )2]−2E [(mA −mB )(X −Y )]+E [(X −Y )2]
⇔V ar (mA −mB )+E [mA −mB ]2 −2E [mA X +mB Y −mB X −mAY ]+V ar (X −Y )+E [X −Y ]2
It holds that V ar (X −Y ) =V ar (X )+V ar (Y )−2σX ,Y .
Further, V ar (mA−mB ) =V ar (mA)+V ar (mB ) since Cov(mA,mB ) = 0, because both estimates
come from independent samples.













The RENAs prediction error
In contrast, the RENAs again (implicitly) calculates only the sample-dispersion around his






[(mA −mB )− (Ai −Bi )]2
]
(A.7)
Following a similar proof as in the earlier section, this is equal to
σ2X +σ2Y −2σX ,Y (A.8)
or simply V ar (X −Y ).
The direct comparison shows that the RENA underestimates future variation in sample means
by a factor of 2 n+1n on average.
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A.4 Proposition 5: Predictions via Regression Analysis
The proof follows the same logic as the one presented in Chapter 11 in von Auer (2005). Let
ŷt+1 be the forecast of the unknown outcome yt+1 based on OLS-parameter estimates α̂ and β̂
as well as the known predictor xt+1. Mathematically, ŷt+1 = β̂xt+1+α̂ and yt+1 =α+βxt+1+εt+1.
The true prediction error can be calculated by
V ar (yt+1 − ŷt+1) = E
[
[(yt+1 − ŷt+1)−E(yt+1 − ŷt+1)]2
]
(A.9)
Because E [εt+1] = 0, E [α̂] =α and E [β̂] =β, (A.9) can be simplified to








[xt+1(β− β̂)+ (α− α̂)+εt+1]2
]
⇔E [[xt+1(β− β̂)+ (α− α̂)]2 −2εt+1(α− α̂)]−2εt+1(β− β̂)+ε2t+1]
⇔E [[xt+1(β− β̂)+ (α− α̂)]2]−2E [εt+1(α− α̂)]−2E [εt+1(β− β̂)]+E [ε2t+1]
Because the sample-parameters as well as the true parameters are independent of the future
random error as well as E [[εt+1] = 0, it must hold that E [εt+1(α−α̂)] = 0 and E [εt+1(β− β̂)] = 0.
Further, E [ε2t+1] =V ar (εt+1)+E [εt+1]2 =V ar (εt+1) =σ2
Hence, the expression above boils down to
σ2 +E [[xt+1(β− β̂)+ (α− α̂)]2]
which is equivalent to
σ2 +E [[xt+1(β− β̂)]2 + (α− α̂)2 +2xt+1(β− β̂)(α− α̂)]
⇔σ2 +x2t+1E [(β− β̂)2]+E [(α− α̂)2]+2xt+1E [(β− β̂)(α− α̂)]
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With E [(α− α̂)2] =V ar (α̂) and E [(β− β̂)2] =V ar (β̂), it transforms to
σ2 +x2t+1V ar (β̂)+V ar (α̂)+2xt+1E [(β− β̂)(α− α̂)] (A.11)
which leaves the last part to be calculated explicitly.
E [(β− β̂)(α− α̂)]
⇔E [αβ− β̂α− α̂β+ β̂α̂]
⇔−αβ+E [β̂α̂]
with α̂ being the OLS estimator as thus α̂= ȳ − β̂x̄:
−αβ+E [β̂(ȳ − β̂x̄)]
⇔−αβ+ ȳE [β̂]− x̄E [β̂2]
⇔−αβ+ ȳβ− x̄[V ar (β̂)+β2]
⇔−αβ+β(ȳ −βx̄)− x̄[V ar (β̂)]
⇔−αβ+βα− x̄[V ar (β̂)]
⇔− x̄[V ar (β̂)]
Plugging this into expression (A.11), I get
σ2 +x2t+1V ar (β̂)+V ar (α̂)−2xt+1x̄[V ar (β̂)]







and V ar (β̂) = σ2∑T
t=1(xt−x̄)2










which concludes the proof.
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Appendix B
Autonomy Support and Innovation
B.1 Low future benefits
Pattern I: Conditions
For Pattern I with investments in each period, s∗a,1 > 0 and s∗a,2 > 0, given by Equations (2.6) and
(2.7), must hold. For this to be the case, neither can vPα be too low (which holds by assumption
vP
α
> 2), nor can s̄ be too high, as is stated by condition in Equation (2.11), or too low, as is
stated in Equation (2.12). Also, the optimal s∗a,1 in Equation (2.6) cannot be too high, otherwise
the principal will not find it optimal to invest in period t = 2 as well. For s∗a,1 (Equation (2.7))

















which is the necessary condition for Pattern I with investments in each period to exist.
The threshold condition in Equation (2.11) follows directly from s∗a,1 > 0 in Equation (2.7). The
threshold condition in Equation (2.12) follows directly from plugging the optimal investment
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levels s∗a,1 > 0 and s∗a,2 > 0 into the principal’s time-interdependent profit function (Equation
(2.3)) and solving for the s̄ guaranteeing the principal non zero profits for her investments.
Pattern II: Conditions









3 ≥ s̄i . Further, it requires s∗a,2 > 0, implying that the condition in Equation
(2.13) must hold.

























































3 , Equation (2.6) states that s∗a,2 = 0 is optimal for the principal. Further,
since 1
δ
−pδ > β, this fulfills the condition in Equation (2.14) and s̄ lies above the threshold
level ensuring s∗a,1 = 0. Hence, under this condition the principal will not invest in any period.
B.2 High future benefits
Pattern IV: Conditions
When future benefits are high for the principal, she wants to invest a positive amount in t = 1.
With 1δ −
p
δ ≤ β, sa,1 is such that it exceeds Equation (B.1) and there are no investments are
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made in t = 2. With s∗a,2 = 0 the optimization problem of the principal in t = 1 becomes
maxsa,1
(δs̄ + sa,1) 12 −1




(δ2 s̄ +δsa,1) 12
]
(B.2)


















which simplifies to δ+pδβ ≥ 1 or β ≥ 1p
δ
−pδ, respectively. This holds as 1δ −
p
δ ≤ β holds
and 1δ ≥ 1pδ is true for δ ∈ (0,1).
The condition in Equation (2.15) follows directly from equation (B.3). The condition in Equa-
tion (2.16) follows directly from plugging the optimal investment levels s∗a,1 > 0 and s∗a,2 = 0
into the principals time-interdependent profit function (Equation (2.3)) and solving for the
s̄ guaranteeing the principal nonzero profits for her investment. These conditions therefore
describe Pattern IV.
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B.3 Model version with complements
Model setup
We show that except for the u-shaped Pattern II and the no investment Pattern V, the invest-
ment patterns in the main section emerge also under the assumption of complementarity. We
introduce complementarity by assuming that the agent’s initial level and the investments by
the principal multiply, implying that the principal only invests if the agent arrives with at least
a minimal positive s̄. The total value of Autonomy Support s̄1 and s̄2 available to the agent in
periods t = 1,2 becomes
s̄1 = s̄ · sa,1
s̄2 = s̄ ·δsa,1 + s̄ · sa,2
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that only Autonomy support provided by the principal is
discounted. The agent’s utility as a function of his innovative activity i for periods t = 1,2 are








UA(i ,2) = v A i
1+ i −
i
s̄ · (δsa,1 + sa,2)




The principal’s profit functions for periods t = 1,2 are
ΠP (sa,1,1) = vP i
1+ i −αsa,1 +βΠP (sa,2,2)
ΠP (sa,2,2) = vP i
1+ i −αsa,2
We solve the model by Backward Induction.
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Solving the model
Period 2
The agent chooses the optimal level of i to maximize his utility UA(i ,2), resulting in




Innovative activity in period t = 2, i∗2 , is only greater than zero if sa,2 ≥ 1− 1s̄ −δsa,1.
If 1s̄ +δsa,1 is large enough, the principal does not have to provide additional Autonomy Sup-
port in the second period to induce innovative effort by the agent. If investments in the first
period have vanished such that δsa,1 = 0, then sa,2 must be high enough to instill innovation
in the second period.
The principal maximizesΠP (sa,2,2), which with the agent’s choice becomes
maxsa,2
s̄(δsa,1 + sa,2)) 12 −1
(s̄(δsa,1 + sa,2)) 12
vP −αsa,2
in order to derive her optimal investment in the second period by taking the agent’s innovation









3 −δsa,1 ≥ 0 (B.4)
Similar to the main section, the optimal value of s∗a,2 decreases in α and increases in vP . The
principal only invests in Autonomy Support in the second period if her investment in the first








3 making additional investments unnecessary.
104
AUTONOMY SUPPORT AND INNOVATION
Period 1
Optimizing UA(i ,1) leads to the agent’s optimal choice of innovative activity in period t = 1:
i∗1 = (s̄ · sa,1)
1
2 −1 ≥ 0
The principal takes i∗1 as well as the discounted future consequences of her choice of sa,1 into
account. She maximizesΠP (sa,1,1) which has become
maxsa,1
(s̄ · sa,1) 12 −1
(s̄ · sa,1) 12
vP −αsa,1 +βΠ̄2 +αβδsa,1

























3 ≥ 0 (B.5)
where (α−βδα) > 0, because δ,β< 1.
Results: Autonomy Support investment patterns
As in the main section, the investment patterns that emerge depend on the benefit-cost ratio
vP
α
, the agent’s depreciation rate of Autonomy Support δ and the principal’s discount factor β,
and can be distinguished by the relationship between β and δ.
Low future benefit investment patterns under β< 1δ −
p
δ
When either or both β and δ are low, the principal has lower incentives to invest which results
in lower investments.
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Pattern A: Investment in each period
When the principal wants to lower investments, she may have to invest in each period. For
















































are strictly positive, this expression holds for as long as β < 1
δ
−pδ which is
the same necessary condition as in the main section with substitutability. However, there is
no explicit upper threshold s̄ that renders s∗a,1 to zero. Therefore, there is no u-shaped pattern
with complementarity.
Inserting s∗a,1 and s
∗
a,2 (from Equations (B.5) and (B.4)) into the profit function we derive the
principal’s payoff














































, the lower s̄ can be without setting s∗a,1 = 0. The threshold depends negatively
on δ and β, as long as δ,β ∈ (0,1), which by assumption, they are. Hence, if s̄ is not too low
the principal invests a positive amount in both periods in the low future benefit investment
pattern.
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Pattern B: No investment
































∈ [0.125,1] for δ,β ∈ [0,1].





the principal does not invest in either period, such that
s∗a,1 = s∗a,2 = 0.
High future benefit investment patterns under β≥ 1δ −
p
δ
Pattern C: Investment only in first period
With high future benefits when both β and δ are high, the principal wants higher investments



















such that the principal never wants to invest in period t = 2 and chooses s∗a,2 = 0. Her maxi-
mization problem in period t = 1 becomes
maxsa,1
(s̄ · sa,1) 12 −1




(δs̄ · sa,1) 12
]
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3 , guaranteeing that s∗a,2 in Pattern C is zero.
Comparison to the model version in the main section
For the low future benefits case, the principal either invests in both periods when the agent ar-
rives with a sufficiently high initial amount of Autonomy Support, or invests in neither period
if the agent does not. The u-shaped Pattern II in the main section does not emerge. Once the
agent’s Autonomy Support stock is too low, the principal has no incentive to top it up under
complementarity.
For high future benefits, the principal always invests, but only in the second period. The no
investment Pattern V in the main section does not emerge due to high future benefits. Be-
cause of the complementarity, her incentive to invest a lot ‘in advance’ pays off stronger in the
later period.
Although the complementarity version features a different core assumption, the main results




< 0 and ∂s
∗
a,2
∂s̄ < 0 for δ> 0. In a way, there is a certain degree of substitutabil-
ity even under the assumption of complementarity. Second, whether the principal invests in
each or only one period depends on the β-δ relationship. As in the main section, this relation-
ship is displayed by β≶ 1
δ
+pδ reflecting the future benefits of investments.
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The Dry Powder Paradox of Monetary
Policy
Proof for Section 4
Fiscal Dominance: Discretionary Case
The constraint on real interest expenses is given by
(it −πt )Bt−1 ≤ (1+πt )[Ωt − (1+ it )Gt ] (C.1)
Using the definitions
g t = Gt −G
Y
bt = Bt −B
Y
ωt = Ωt −Ω
Y










− (1+ it )
(





THE DRY POWDER PARADOX OF MONETARY POLICY
Expanding and neglecting cross terms
(it −πt ) B
Y
≤ωt + (1+πt )Ω
Y
− g t − (1+πt + it )G
Y
(C.3)
multiplying by Y and collecting terms





B +G (ωt − g t )+
B +Ω−G
B +G πt (C.5)
Under discretion, the equilibrium has
it =π(δ)+φr r et +φuut
πt =π(δ)+ψuut +ψr r et
where, as before, π(δ) = κ(λ−δσ)
α(1−β)+κ2 . The approximated rollover condition after some reformu-
lations gets






where ιr , ιu , ιc , ιg are coefficients independent of δ. Since π′(δ) < 0 it must hold that
∂S̄
∂δ
> 0 ⇔ B +Ω−G
B +G < 1 ⇔ G >
Ω
2
which implies that δ diminishes the chances for encountering a fiscal dominance scenario
under discretion if the government sector is sufficiently large in comparison to the rollover
capacity.
If the sign of π′(δ) is reversed (as in the commitment case), the opposite is true.
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